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The South China Sea (SCS) has become an international focal point in recent years 
largely due to China’s reclamation and militarization of island features in contested waters.  
Many pundits, journalists, analysts, and researchers distill the motivation behind China’s 
activities, and the broader SCS international disputes, down to control of and access to 
resources—primarily fisheries and hydrocarbon reserves—and shipping routes. Most 
scholars and experts on the region agree that these factors play an important role; however, 
many also point to broader motivations for China’s staunch defense of its “national 
sovereignty.” Nonetheless, a key element is often lacking in many of the most thorough 
analyses of the SCS conflicts: the geographic perspective. A wide range of publicly-available 
spatial data makes such an assessment possible. This thesis examines the existing body of 
scholarly work on the SCS, its significance, and causes of conflict; assesses the main 
hypotheses for China’s militarization of contested features in the SCS geographically; and 
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CHINA’S MILITARIZATION OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
Introduction 
 In the years that followed World War II, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam rushed to occupy territory in the South China Sea (SCS). The SCS islands and 
other features,1 including those classified under international law as rocks or low-tide 
elevations, have long been contested by regional states as well as external powers. While 
many of these features may at first appear to be little more than navigation hazards, their 
recognized possession can give their owners access to the surrounding marine territory and 
its resources. Around the 1990s, disputes between claimants turned from strictly territorial 
concerns to conflict based on resources.2 As populations grew throughout East Asia, demand 
for seafood and hydrocarbons, particularly crude oil, increased drastically. Controlling 
maritime territory meant controlling these resources and others, such as phosphoric acid and 
lime mines on islands, metallic ores on the seafloor, and other potential seabed resources.3 
More recently, conflicts in the SCS have developed beyond access to territory and resources 
into a strategic rivalry between China with its growing military capabilities and the United 
                                                          
Political Science Quarterly 
 
1 This thesis will refer to features as a broad term encompassing islands, rocks, low-tide elevations 
(including as rocks, shoals, reefs, and atolls submerged at high tide), and artificial islands and their structures. 
 
2 Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and the U.S.-China Strategic 
Rivalry,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012): 139, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.666495. 
 
3 Anders Corr, Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea (Annapolis: 




States over its continued regional presence.4 Concerns regarding this rivalry have fueled 
Chinese fears that the United States may impede the flow of trade in the SCS to punish China 
while many Western observers fear that existing conflicts in the SCS may disrupt global 
trade.  
 China’s growing economic power has fueled its military expansion and while China 
has emphasized that its ascent is peaceful, its actions in the SCS indicate otherwise. In 2015, 
President Xi Jinping stated in a joint press conference with Barack Obama: “We're 
committed to respecting and upholding the freedom of navigation and overflight that 
countries enjoy according to international law. Relevant construction activities that China are 
[sic] undertaking...do not target or impact any country, and China does not intend to pursue 
militarization.”5 The relevant construction activities Xi referenced were China’s island-
building activities in the SCS, specifically in the Spratly Islands6 in the eastern-central SCS. 
Although China lays claim to most of the SCS, China does not occupy all the features in the 
region but engages in ongoing disputes with its neighbors. Those features China claims and 






                                                          
4 Buszynski, “The South China Sea,” 139-140. 
 
5 Xi Jinping, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in 




6 The various SCS claimants refer to the islands and features in the SCS by many different names 






Some of China’s island claims, including all of China’s claims in the Spratly Islands, 
fall within hotly contested maritime space. China’s declaration of a sweeping “nine-dash” 
line claim encompasses most of the SCS.7 Likewise, Taiwan maintains the same claim as 
mainland China based on maps made by the Kuomintang (KMT) government of the Republic 
of China before it retreated to Taiwan.8 The lines drawn by the KMT government were 
adopted by the Communist Party on subsequent maps once the Party came to power over the 
mainland in 1949.9 In addition, Vietnam claims both the Spratly and Paracel islands; 
                                                          
7 China’s claims are referred to by many names, including the “dashed-line,” the “dotted line,” the 
“cow’s tongue,” the “U-shaped line,” and the “nine-dash line.” This thesis will refer to this claim as the nine-
dash line, which is the most common term used in literature on the SCS maritime disputes. 
 
8 Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,” Naval War 
College Review 64, no. 1 (2011): 44, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/6. 
 
9 Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives,” 44. 
Figure 1. China’s nine-dash line and territorial claims in the South China Sea and regional 
Exclusive Economic Zones. 
Source: Chinese Maritime Territory Claims [map]. March 2019. 1:15,000,000; generated 
by the author using ArcGIS Version 10.6. 
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Malaysia claims features in the southern Spratlys; Brunei quietly maintains several claims in 
the southern SCS; and the Philippines claims much of the eastern Spratlys.10  
 The Chinese Government issued two notes verbales to the United Nations Secretary 
General in 2009 stating that China exercises “indisputable sovereignty” over the SCS islands 
and their adjacent waters, including sovereign rights and jurisdiction over these waters and 
the seabed, with an attached map to demonstrate these claims.11 The attached map featured 
nine line segments, similar to those presented in Figure 1. Two years later, China issued 
another note verbale that added, “China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in 
the South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence.”12 China’s 
historical claims were found incompatible with international law—the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) in The Hague. In The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, 
the PCA sided with the Philippines, which brought the case against China to the international 
court. The PCA concluded in 2016 that, “to the extent China had historic rights to resources 
in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were 
incompatible with the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) provided for in the Convention 
[UNCLOS].”13 China emphatically rejected the ruling. UNCLOS established EEZs as features 
                                                          
10 Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives,” 44. 
 
11 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (Washington, DC, 2014), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf. 
 
12 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. 
 
13 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of 





of international law that grant coastal states rights to waters extending up to 200 nautical 
miles from their land territories, giving these states regulatory rights over economic activities 
within their EEZs.14 These economic activities include fishing and hydrocarbon (oil and gas) 
exploration. Within the EEZ, states also have contiguous zones that extend 24 nautical miles 
from land that are considered international waters, and territorial seas that extend 12 nautical 
miles from land that are considered sovereign territory and include the airspace above and the 
seabed below these territorial waters.15 UNCLOS notably does not grant coastal states the 
right to regulate foreign military vessel activity within their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-
mile territorial seas, although China and a minority of other states contest this protection for 
foreign vessels.16 Under UNCLOS, all ships—both military and civilian—have rights to 
innocent passage through the territorial seas of other countries.17 Innocent passage requires 
that vessels move through territorial seas directly; vessels are not required to provide advance 
notice or obtain permission to pass through these waters.18 States’ 24-nautical-mile 
contiguous zones and 200-nautical-mile EEZs are considered international waters in which 
free navigation, whether civilian or military, cannot be limited.19    
 While a state’s shoreline grants it a territorial sea (12 nm), a contiguous zone 
                                                          
14 Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Actions in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests—
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R42784 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784. 
 
15 Eleanor Freund, “Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide,” Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2017, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide. 
 
16 O’Rourke, China’s Actions in South and East China Seas. 
 
17 Freund, “Freedom of Navigation.”  
 
18 Freund, “Freedom of Navigation.”  
 
19 Freund, “Freedom of Navigation.”  
6 
 
(territorial sea and 12nm in addition), and an EEZ (200 nm), maritime features classified as 
islands also grant rights to these same maritime zones.20 Features classified as rocks generate 
a contiguous zone (24 nm total) and low-tide elevations generate no maritime zones.21 These 
rights, however, only apply to naturally-formed features and not artificial ones; even an 
artificial island constructed on a low-tide elevation feature would still be considered a low-
tide elevation under international law.22       
 China has used its nine-dash line to claim various features throughout the SCS, 
construct artificial islands, and install mixed-use civilian and military infrastructure on 
natural and man-made maritime features.23 Significantly, China has not published the 
coordinates of its nine-dash line claim. Some Chinese maps indicate more than nine dashes 
(ten or eleven) with varied extents and locations. These discrepancies have produced 
inconsistent interpretations of China’s claim.24 Approximate calculations by the U.S. 
Department of State determined that the nine-dash line encompasses approximately 2 million 
square kilometers of maritime space and approximately 13 square kilometers of land area.25 
These 13 square kilometers include three groups of land features: the Paracel Islands, the 
                                                          
20 Freund, “Freedom of Navigation.” 
 
21 Freund, “Freedom of Navigation.” 
 
22 Freund, “Freedom of Navigation.” 
 
23 This thesis will use a broad definition of the term militarize to include: giving military 
characteristics, equipping with military forces and infrastructure, and adapting for military use or purposes. 
 
24 The nine-dash line visualized several times throughout this thesis is a generalization based on a 
Chinese map. Other Chinese maps, however, portray the nine-dash line as encompassing a greater portion of the 
SCS. Most estimates place China’s claim as consisting of 80-90 percent of the SCS (though this is likely closer 
to 60 percent). China’s cartographic inconsistencies make it difficult to understand China’s claim in its entirety 
and the visualizations included herein should not be interpreted as definitive. 
 
25 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. 
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Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal which China controls but has not yet built upon.26 In 
the Spratly Islands alone, China added over 3,200 acres of land by late 2015 in the form of 
artificial islands on seven occupied features.27 While President Xi claimed that same year that 
China was not pursuing SCS militarization, construction at these features included airfields, 
port and storage facilities, fighter-sized aircraft hangars, fixed-weapons positions, military 
barracks and administration buildings, and communications facilities.28 More recently, China 
deployed additional military platforms to installations in the SCS including military aircraft 
and missile systems, expanding China’s regional military capabilities and reach.29  
 China denies that its military actions amount to militarization, characterizing its 
activities as defensive in nature. Rather, this label is one largely assigned by Western sources 
and states that contest China’s claims. In 2018, for example, a Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson stated that China’s activities are “peace-building” and occur in “China’s own 
territories, including national defense facilities,” claiming that these actions are “necessary to 
safeguard China’s sovereignty and security.”30 This thesis will use militarization as opposed 
to national defense as a general term to refer broadly to China’s activities that are military-
                                                          
26 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. 
 
27 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,” U.S.  Department of Defense, May 15, 2017, 
12, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF. 
 
28 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,” 12. 
 
29 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “China Lands First Bomber on South China Sea Island,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 18, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/china-lands-first-bomber-
south-china-sea-island/. 
 
30 Nike Ching, “US to China: 'Consequences' for Militarization of South China Sea,” Voice of America, 





related, such as installing military infrastructure on artificial islands in the SCS, and 
expanding the scope of China’s military power, such as placing long-range systems on SCS 
features. 
 While China is not the only claimant to territory beyond its EEZs and is not the only 
claimant to construct artificial islands and to develop these and other features, its military 
actions are viewed as unprecedented and provocative, leading journalists, scholars, and 
policymakers to question China’s motivations. Many distill the primary motive to one of 
three major factors: control of fish stocks, control of hydrocarbons, or control of strategic sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs) in the SCS. This thesis analyzes the evidence for and merits 
of each idea, which, for the purpose of this inquiry, are labeled the fisheries, hydrocarbons, 
and SLOCs hypotheses. Before examining each individual hypothesis, this chapter first 
provides additional context for China’s contested historical claims as well as the military 
development that has enabled China’s actions in the SCS.  
China’s Historical Claims 
In his press conference with Barack Obama, Xi Jinping firmly asserted China’s 
position: “Islands in the South China Sea since ancient times are China’s territory. We have 
the right to uphold our own territorial sovereignty and lawful and legitimate maritime 
rights and interests.”31 China’s historical claims, however, carry little weight where 
international law is concerned. According to SCS scholar Leszek Buszynski of the 
Australian Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, China views this legal reality with 
resentment, considering international dismissal of historical claims as a degradation of its 
                                                          




ancestral heritage.32 From China’s perspective, its claims predate UNCLOS and the 
Convention should be revisited to more fully recognize historical rights.33 China’s staunch 
defense of territory it regards as historically Chinese is underpinned by a strong sense of 
Chinese nationalism, stimulated by Xi Jinping who, upon his ascent to General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of China in 2012, charged: “Do not lose any territory we inherited 
from our ancestors.”34 According to Bill Hayton, a long-time reporter on Southeast Asia 
and fellow at the London-based Chatham House Asia-Pacific Programme, the SCS islands 
have meaning beyond territory and resource access; their possession symbolizes national 
pride and power.35          
 Anthropological studies of the Asia-Pacific reveal that the people who first 
discovered the SCS islands have no modern-day equivalent of an ethnic identity, much less 
a political state.36 In more recent centuries, China has maintained documented contact with 
the SCS islands through “fishermen, traders, and the occasional government official.”37 
Similarly, Vietnamese records document the same activities as China throughout the SCS, 
and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have also used the islands to support and 
facilitate fishing and trade.38 Use by all regional states made the SCS a historical commons 
                                                          
32 Buszynski, “The South China Sea,” 140. 
 
33 Buszynski, “The South China Sea,” 140. 
 
34 John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Security Agenda Transcends the South China Sea,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 4 (2016): 212, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194056. 
 
35 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2014), xiii. 
 
36 Hayton, The South China Sea,7. 
 
37 Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives,” 47. 
 
38 Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives,” 47. 
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rather than territory exclusive to one state.39       
 While China’s access to and use of the SCS varied over the centuries, China’s 
territorial claims to the SCS emerged more recently in three 20 th-century documents. The 
first was a 1947 location map released by the Nationalist government;40 the second was the 
1958 “Declaration of the Government of New China on the Territorial Sea;” and the third 
was the “1992 Law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.”41 Zheng Zhihua, an oceans 
law and policy scholar and director of the Joint Institute for Maritime Law and History at 
East China University, writes: “From the point of view of China, one of the world’s oldest 
civilizations, the South China Sea is part of the traditional Asian order and, hence, it would 
be inappropriate to comprehend the Nine-Dash Line by relying solely on the Westphalian 
nation-state system.”42 Zheng articulates that the “so-called ambiguity” of China’s nine-
dash line claims stems from the “imperfection of UNCLOS,” which rests on defective and 
non-standard international law on historic rights, and should be improved for greater 
clarity.43          
 Like Zheng and other scholars, Hayton places the development of China’s claims in 
the 20th century. Hayton, however, argues that China’s claims emerged in three distinct 
                                                          
39 Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives,” 47-48. 
 
40 The Nationalist or Kuomintang (KMT) government retreated to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese 
Civil War with the Communist Party of China in 1949.  
 
41 Zheng Zhihua, “Why Does China’s Maritime Claim Remain Ambiguous?” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, June 12, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/why-does-
chinas-maritime-claim-remain-ambiguous/. 
 
42 Zhihua, “Why Does China’s Maritime Claim Remain Ambiguous?” 
 




episodes in response to domestic political crises for domestic audiences;44 this produced a 
maritime geobody—that is, a “collective psychological attachment to offshore islands”—
that appeared incrementally and developed into nationalist sentiments.45 This viewpoint has 
led some scholars to consider that China’s actions in the SCS are motivated by ideological 
factors including popular sentiments that China must reclaim its lost territories.46 
Furthermore, some posit that a nationalist vision, promoted by President Xi Jinping and 
spread throughout the Chinese nation, has spurred China’s military development.47 In 
addition to ideological factors, the rapid development and modernization of China’s armed 
forces and military activities in the SCS are possibly motivated by China’s desire to achieve 
great power status and to counter U.S. naval supremacy in maritime territory it views as 
sovereign.48  
China’s Military Development and Actions in the SCS 
In 1978, China entered a period of greater openness and economic reform through 
its pivotal “Four Modernizations” plan, which included national defense. China increased 
                                                          
44 Bill Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims: Maps, Misunderstandings, 
and the Maritime Geobody,” Modern China 45, no. 2 (2019): 128, doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700418771678. 
 
45 Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 164. 
 
46 For discussions of this perspective, see Johnathan Dixon, “East China Sea or South China Sea, They 
Are All China’s Seas: Comparing Nationalism Among China’s Maritime Irredentist Claims,” Nationalities 
Papers 42, no. 6 (2014): 1053, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.969693, and Luo Xi, “The South 
China Sea Case and China’s New Nationalism: Putting Chinese Nationalism in Historical Context,” The 
Diplomat, July 19, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-case-and-chinas-new-
nationalism/. 
 
47 See, for example, Robert S. Ross, “Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism: From the 
Nineteenth Century to the Rise of China,” Naval War College Review 71, no. 4 (2018): 21, https://digital-
commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4/, and Bonnie S. Glaser and Matthew P. Funairole, “Xi Jinping’s 
19th Party Congress Speech Heralds Greater Assertiveness in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, October 26, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/xi-jinpings-19th-party-congress-speech-
heralds-greater-assertiveness-chinese-foreign-policy. 
 
48 Ross, “Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism,” 22-23. 
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military expenditures following the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis during which China 
conducted missile tests and military exercises in a show of force near Taiwan. As indicated 










In 2015, China’s military expenditures were estimated at $214 billion, compared to an 
estimate of $26 billion in 1995.49 Sustained economic growth has spurred these increases in 
spending and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ability to modernize China’s military.50 
China’s estimated military expenditures have remained generally proportionate to China’s 
                                                          
49 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database (Stockholm: 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017), https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
 
SIPRI defines military expenditures as “all current and capital military expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, 
including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence [sic] ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence 
[sic] projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) 
military space activities.” SIPRI’s methodology for estimating China’s expenditures can be found at 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/sources-and-methods. 
 
50 Eric Heginbotham and Jacob Heim, “Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese 









Figure 2. China’s estimated military expenditures in billions of constant (2015) 
U.S. dollars from 1989-2016.  
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure 




gross domestic product (GDP); expenditures have averaged approximately 2% of GDP 
since 1990.51 China’s GDP in 1995 was approximately $735 billion in current U.S. dollars; 
by 2015, this figure had risen to over $11 trillion in current U.S. dollars.52  
In 2013, Liff and Erickson recalled former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s question regarding China’s defense spending at the June 2005 Shangri-La 
Dialogue: “Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing 
investment? Why these continuing large and expanded arms purchases? Why these continued 
deployments?”53 Liff and Erickson, however, concluded that the motivations behind China’s 
military modernization and spending increases are less opaque when considered in aggregate, 
are largely focused on regional considerations, and are intended to compensate for inflation 
and prior neglect.54 Several years into Xi’s presidency, Erickson took a different tone 
regarding China’s military capabilities, claiming that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 
power projection abilities are expanding in the Pacific and, that soon, “…Beijing will have 
very few peers in the increasingly expensive combination of quality and quantity that makes 
a truly great power military.”55         
                                                          
51 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database. 
 
52 The World Bank Databank, China-GDP in Current US$ (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 
2017), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN. 
 
53 Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious 
in the Aggregate,” The China Quarterly, 216 (2013): 805-806, doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741013000295. 
 
54 Liff and Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending,” 826-827. 
 
 55 Michael Forsythe, “Andrew S. Erickson on China’s Military Goals and Capabilities.” The New York 





A key component of the “Chinese Dream,” Xi’s frequently-invoked slogan of national 
rejuvenation, is “building a powerful military” with modernized defense and armed forces.56 
Xi discussed these measures in his October 18, 2017, speech to the 19th National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China: “Historic breakthroughs have been made in reforming 
national defense and the armed forces…This represents a revolutionary restructuring…We 
have stepped up weapons and equipment development, and made major progress in 
enhancing military preparedness.”57  
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has noted China’s increasing ability to 
project power through “peacetime operations” as well as an “expanding capacity to contest 
U.S. military superiority in the event of a regional conflict.”58 With over 2.3 million military 
personnel, excluding the PLA reserves and paramilitary police force, China maintains the 
world’s largest standing military;59 China is also the world’s second-highest military 
spender following the United States.60 The DoD iterates that China’s officially disclosed 
budget information as well as spending estimates are not precise measures of military 
investments due to China’s “poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition to a 
market economy,” and also that “China’s published military budget omits several major 
                                                          
56 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects 
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” (speech, Beijing,  
October 18, 2017), Xinhua, 5, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC 
_National_Congress.pdf. 
 
 57 Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory,” 5. 
 
 58 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017.” 
 
 59 Ian E. Rinehart, The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R44196 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44196.pdf. 
 
60 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 




categories of expenditure, such as R&D and the procurement of foreign weapons and 
equipment.”61  
China’s State Council Information Office published China’s military strategy in a 
2015 white paper. This document only references the United States twice explicitly; 
however, indirect references to the U.S. military and its activity in the Asia-Pacific region 
permeate the document. The white paper references “threats from hegemonism, power 
politics and neo-interventionism” as well as “competition for the redistribution of power, 
rights and interests.”62 Additionally, the paper criticizes “external countries” for provocative 
behavior and “meddling in South China Sea affairs;” this document also calls for Chinese 
“work…to seize the strategic initiative in military competition.”63     
 Chinese hostility in the SCS increased under the administration of former Chinese 
president Hu Jintao64 in 2007 after several decades of intermittent conflict followed by 
relative stability. In 2007, China warned U.S. and other foreign oil and gas corporations to 
cease resource exploration with Vietnamese firms in the SCS, or face unspecified 
consequences.65 Throughout several key incidents in the 1970s to 1990s, the United States 
maintained a neutral position under the condition that involved parties pursued peaceful 
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means of resolution.66 Chinese attacks on Vietnamese forces in the Paracels in 1974 and the 
Spratlys in 1988, as well as China’s military occupation of a reef claimed by the Philippines 
in the Spratlys in the 1990s, motivated China’s neighbors to form the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in political opposition to China’s assertive posture.67 
Peter Dutton, director of China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College, credits 
conflicts between China and Vietnam in the SCS during Jintao’s administration as setting the 
stage for a more assertive and aggressive approach in the SCS.68 
After Xi Jinping entered office in 2013, China continued pursuing greater military 
capabilities in the SCS through construction of artificial islands and military infrastructure. In 
2015, under increasing international scrutiny, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the People’s 
Liberation Army Admiral Sun Jianguo explicated China’s strategies and policies. Sun 
emphasized the Chinese military’s role in UN peacekeeping missions, including China’s 
status as the largest force contributor to peacekeeping among the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council.69 Sun touted China’s naval contributions to protecting Chinese and 
foreign ships in the Gulf of Aden from acts of piracy; Sun also noted China’s increasing 
engagement with other militaries, stating that, “up to now [2015], the Chinese military has 
conducted over 100 joint military exercises and training activities with more than 50 
countries.”70 Despite heightened focus on the SCS, Admiral Sun notably de-emphasized 
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China’s territorial claims and military actions in the region. Wu Shengli, Commander of the 
Chinese Navy, vowed that China will “never give up halfway” in its construction of islands 
and that China is prepared to respond to provocations and infringements on its claims.71 
Figure 3 displays China’s maritime claims, the locations of China’s claimed and controlled 




Despite China’s controversial actions in the SCS, Chinese leaders have emphasized 
peaceful development since President Xi Jinping assumed power. A 2013 white paper titled 
“The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces” stresses the following: an 
“independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in 
nature;” that China “opposes any form of hegemonism or power politics;” and that China will 
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http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-07/19/content_7163182.htm. 
Figure 3. China’s reported military power projection (aircraft and missile) capabilities in the 
South China Sea. 
Source: Chinese power projection in the South China Sea [map]. April 2018. 1:20,000,000; 
generated by the author using ArcGIS Version 10.6. 
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“never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military 
expansion.”72 It is the focus on upholding peace and maintaining national defense that 
Chinese officials underscore rhetorically with regard to the SCS despite actions that 
contradict these talking points.     
Conclusion 
China’s prosperity in the 21st century has fueled Xi’s nationalist Chinese Dream and 
the modernization and streamlining of China’s military. China is expanding its ability to 
project power regionally through its maritime claims and military infrastructure in the SCS. 
China has also begun an aircraft carrier program; has made substantial advances in its missile 
forces, anti-ship and air defenses; and has increased independent and joint military exercises 
to expand its sphere of influence.73 China’s military investment, policy shifts, and priorities, 
particularly under the Xi Jinping administration, have enabled China to expand and defend its 
efforts in the SCS. The remainder of this thesis considers a variety of geographic 
considerations in a region characterized by ongoing power competition. Through the lens of 
geography and political science, the following chapters analyze the geopolitics of power in 
the SCS focusing on natural resources, maritime space, and territory to better understand 
China’s behavior in the SCS.         
 Because a comprehensive geopolitical analysis of these factors has not yet been 
conducted, this writing fills a gap in existing literature on the SCS. This thesis adopts 
political geographer Ladis Kristof’s working definition of geopolitics as “the study of 
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political phenomena (1) in their spatial relationship and (2) in their relationship with, 
dependence upon, and influence on, earth as well as on all those cultural factors which 
constitute the subject matter of human geography (anthropogeography) broadly defined.”74 
This inquiry focuses heavily on the first portion of Kristof’s definition—that is, the spatial 
relationships of political phenomena. While China’s actions in the SCS amount to 
militarization, the motive for these actions is not plainly evident. The subsequent chapters 
examine the roles of fisheries, hydrocarbons, and sea lines of communication as possible 
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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA’S FISHERIES 
Introduction 
One frequently cited factor behind China’s militarization of the South China Sea 
(SCS) is China’s goal of controlling fisheries in the region. For China and other littoral states 
in the Asia-Pacific, fishing is a core economic activity providing employment, livelihoods, 
food security, and products for trade.75 According to the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), China’s fishery sector provided employment for 14.6 million people in 
2015.76 Nearly 9.5 million people were employed in marine capture while the remainder 
were employed in aquaculture.77 In 2015, associated services including input supply, 
processing, and marketing chains employed nearly 16 million people in addition to capture 
and aquaculture.78 These substantial employment figures reflect China’s position as the 
world’s top fish and fishery products exporter.79 In addition, studies on human nutrition in 
developing nations have labeled most of the SCS countries with enough available data as 
highly reliant on wild fish and most vulnerable to micronutrient malnutrition as fish catches 
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decline.80           
 The total tonnage of fish caught in the SCS has increased steadily from 1.2 million 
tons in 1950 to a high of 15 million tons in 2003 and 13.3 million tons in 2014, the most 
recent year for which this data is available.81 In 2014, the estimated landed value for SCS 
catch was 20.6 billion USD (real 2010 value).82 The highest landed value on record was in 
2009 at 22 billion USD.83 For every recorded year,84 China has led all the countries that 
conduct fishing operations in the SCS (excluding the Gulf of Thailand) in fish catch as 
measured by value85 and tonnage.86 The majority of China’s fish catch comes from within 
China’s legal Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) followed by the South Korean, Russian, and 
Japanese EEZs.87         
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 The combined populations of the SCS countries reached nearly 2 billion in 2015.88 
While these nations have grown in terms of population, they have concurrently developed 
economically and gained the status of some of the world’s fastest growing economies.89 
Simultaneously, marine fisheries have depleted for decades under pressure from these 
growing populations and economies with estimated declines in fish stocks since the 1950s 
ranging from 70 to 95 percent.90 By the mid-1990s, areas of the SCS had seen fish stocks 
decline to less than 10 percent of their levels in the 1960s.91 As demonstrated in Figure 4, 
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Figure 4. Fisheries in the South China Sea by FAO Stock Status. 
Source: Status of the South China Sea Fisheries [map]. March 2019. 1:15,000,000; 
generated by the author using ArcGIS Version 10.6. 
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The degree to which control of the SCS fisheries motivates China’s actions is a subject of 
debate. Some scholars claim that the competition for fish resources is the primary driver 
behind the broader SCS conflict. This chapter will examine this claim and its defenses, then 
consider the body of scholarship and data available to evaluate this assertion.   
The Fisheries Hypothesis 
 Multiple scholars have posited that fisheries drive China’s actions in the SCS, 
including the militarization of artificial islands. For the purposes of this thesis, this concept is 
referred to as the fisheries hypothesis. Greer summarized China’s interests in the SCS as 
consisting of politics, petroleum, and proteins (fish), with competition for the SCS fisheries 
taking priority as the most consequential, and most overlooked, interest driving conflict.92 
Stephens also claimed that fisheries drive the SCS disputes, arguing that this aspect is easily 
overlooked in a region governed by power politics rather than international law, where the 
complexity of numerous disputes overshadows critical environmental considerations.93 
Bartley contended that China’s fishing efforts drive the SCS disputes and constitute a fight 
for legitimacy and authority with broad implications for increased strategic confrontation.94 
Schofield, Sumaila, and Cheung summarized their collective research, arguing that while 
energy resources may motivate “policymakers, commentators, and the media” more 
powerfully than environmental degradation and biodiversity, fisheries and the marine 
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environment are the “real and immediate prizes” in the SCS.95 Given China’s unprecedented 
military activities in the SCS—including creating artificial islands, building major military 
infrastructure, and stationing military aircraft and missiles in and around the SCS—a detailed 
examination of the fisheries hypothesis is warranted.     
 Excluding strategic considerations—which are difficult to judge based on data 
alone—domestic demand and competition over dwindling fish stocks largely drive the race to 
access fisheries in the SCS. Political factors also fuel ongoing depletion. The Chinese 
government’s support of fishing through subsidies contributes substantially, as does China’s 
ability to assert its maritime claims through its fishing fleets. Sumaila and his colleagues 
have argued that China’s high fishing subsidies have contributed to excessive over-fishing.96 
Asia leads the world in fisheries subsidies with Japan and China contributing most 
substantially.97 The rate of fishery depletion has increased since the 1950s due to these 
subsidies as well as emphasis on large volume production over sustainability, technological 
advancements, and soaring demand.98 Mallory found that in China, where the majority of 
subsidies are for fuel, about 95% of subsidies were harmful to fishery sustainability.99 This 
finding shows a gap in Chinese policy—which has sought to manage fisheries responsibly 
due to declines—and demonstrates a lack of policy coherence. In the SCS specifically, 
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Schofield, Sumaila, and Cheung contend that domestic demand and state subsidies actually 
drive China’s domination of the SCS through its fishing fleet capability.100 Fishing vessels 
can serve the dual purposes of catching fish and asserting maritime claims in a proxy role.101 
States that subsidize fishing in the SCS often do so to assert their claims in the face of 
broader economic needs and geopolitical competitions.102     
 In the proxy context, China’s fishing fleets have been dubbed maritime militias.103 
Fishing fleets and Chinese Coast Guard vessels often operate within other EEZs (but within 
China’s declared claim to most of the SCS through its “nine-dash line”), effectively serving 
“hybrid civilian-naval” roles as they carry out coercive maritime diplomacy.104 Vessels in the 
so-called maritime militia are outfitted by the Chinese military with equipment to enhance 
interoperability with the Coast Guard and Navy.105 The fishermen themselves reportedly 
receive civil defense training and political indoctrination, with some also trained to confront 
foreign vessels in disputed maritime territory.106 Nonetheless, Zhang and Bateman counter 
that this military-civilian role is overemphasized since all key SCS claimant states view 
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fishing fleets as means to assert their claims to disputed waters, not solely China.107  
 Chinese policies such as providing fuel subsidies and financing a maritime militia 
further China’s political goals but undermine China’s efforts to restrain overfishing.108 
Examining this conflict is critical to understanding the nuances of fishing activity in the SCS. 
China’s fishing industry has a clear strategic significance and fishing activity in contested 
waters is one way to assert China’s claims as it pursues maritime power status.109 This, in 
turn, fuels conflict with China’s regional neighbors; however, the claim that China’s actions, 
including militarization of SCS, are based on control of SCS fisheries warrants deeper 
examination. 
Evaluating the Fisheries Hypothesis 
China’s inferred goal of controlling the South China Sea’s fisheries can be evaluated 
using various methods. These can include economic value and impact,110 comparative 
valuation of the SCS relative to other large marine environments,111 and qualitative reviews 
of China’s motives and actions regarding the SCS fisheries.112 This chapter primarily focuses 
on geographic tools and spatial data to assess the fisheries hypothesis, augmented by the 
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above-mentioned means. The FAO, the Sea Around Us (SAU) Project at the University of 
British Columbia, and Global Fishing Watch (GFW) all provide spatially-referenced data that 
enable this analysis.         
 The SAU Project is based on FAO and reconstructed data for global fisheries catch 
and landed value dating back to 1950 that can be spatially refined by various units including 
EEZs and large marine environments (LMEs). Researchers cross-referenced and verified the 
accuracy of SAU data using national fisheries statistics from the SCS countries.113 In addition 
to the FAO and national statistical data, SAU also includes reconstructed data for unreported 
catch based on Pauly and Zeller’s estimation methodology.114 The incorporation of 
reconstructed data for undocumented catch more than doubles catch levels in certain areas of 
the world. For example, in the Gulf of Thailand LME, close to half of fish catch in recent 
years was unreported, according to the SAU Project.115 China’s marine territory claims do 
not extend into the Gulf of Thailand. Roughly 70 to 80 percent of total catch was reported in 
the SCS LME; 116 China’s fish catch reporting levels in its EEZs overall are consistently 
high, averaging over 90 percent.117       
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 The Global Fishing Watch (GFW) website, databases, and code were created by 
Oceana, SkyTruth, and Google and funded by a variety of philanthropic foundations with the 
goal of increasing transparency in global fishing activity.118 Oceana is an ocean conservation 
organization; SkyTruth is a nonprofit that provides free satellite imagery and remote sensing 
data to the public to inform and motivate environmental protection;119 and Google Earth 
Outreach uses Google’s data infrastructure to address environmental and humanitarian 
concerns.120 Global Fishing Watch currently provides datasets for vessel tracking via ship-
based Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS); in 
addition, GFW also provides data from the U.S.-operated Visible Infrared Imaging 
Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) satellite sensor to display nighttime vessel light emissions.121 
VIIRS data is unique in that it can help account for fishing activity from vessels not 
broadcasting AIS or VMS. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
provides Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS) such as the Worldview client, through 
which users can access and view recent and historical VIIRS imagery in near-real time. This 
assessment, however, will focus on GFW’s rendering of the same VIIRS data because it is 
optimized for viewing fishing activity. Before analyzing the relevance of these datasets to the 
fisheries hypothesis, a discussion of the datasets and their respective limitations for the 
purposes of this study is required.    
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Automatic Identification Systems 
   Long-range satellite-based AIS is a safety feature that provides situational awareness 
and is mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) of the United Nations to 
avoid collisions under low-visibility conditions for vessels over 300 gross tons or carrying 
passengers.122 Satellite AIS is not limited geographically like terrestrial AIS platforms and 
provides global maritime coverage.123 These systems are self-reporting and provide static 
data, such as ship name, type, and dimensions; they also provide dynamic data including 
position, course, and speed.124 Noncooperative ships, those not broadcasting AIS data, and 
noncompliant ships, those not meeting legal requirements, cannot be included in analyses 
based on AIS alone. Thus, alternative monitoring means such as the use of satellite imagery, 
are necessary to monitor fishing activity more fully. For example, the Chinese government 
funded research that was published in 2019 into using a fusion algorithm between image data 
from China’s GF-4 satellite and AIS reports to better track ships with an emphasis on 
noncooperative targets.125        
 The following figures show fishing activity and vessel presence in the SCS from 
January to December 2016 using AIS data from Global Fishing Watch. AIS data points for 
known or possible commercial fishing vessels were collected by satellite and terrestrial 
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receivers and were classified by GFW’s fishing activity detection algorithm as engaging in 
“apparent fishing activity” due to changes in vessel speed and direction (Figure 5).126 The 
year-long period displays aggregated activity to avoid misrepresentation due to annual 
fishing bans implemented by China unilaterally since 1999 in the northwestern SCS to 
prevent overfishing.127 For two to three months in the summer, China works to prevent nearly 
all types of fishing activity within its own EEZ and in contested waters. This ban was 
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Figure 5. Cumulative fishing vessel activity based on AIS signals from January to 
December 2016. 





Figure 6 shows all recorded vessel presence in 2016 as compared to strictly fishing vessel 
activity as categorized by GFW. A visual comparison of both figures indicates that most 
fishing activity, as well as overall vessel presence recorded by AIS over a one-year time 





Vessel Monitoring Systems 
Similar to AIS, VMS is another tracking tool that is permanently installed on 
commercial fishing vessels with a unique identifier that works with the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) or similar systems to calculate vessel position; VMS sends routine updates to 
authorities, thus enhancing the ability of regulatory agencies to monitor fishing activity.129 As 
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Figure 6. Cumulative vessel presence based on AIS signals from January to December 
2016. 






of March 2019, the only nations that have provided VMS data to GFW for public use are 
Peru and Indonesia. In 2017 and 2018, hardly any Indonesian VMS fishing activity was 
recorded within the northeastern portion of the Indonesian EEZ area within the SCS—an area 
rich in fish stocks as well as oil and natural gas.130 This area, near the Natuna Islands in the 
northeastern area of Indonesia’s EEZ, is claimed by China within its nine-dash line. Chinese 
fishing in the waters around the Natuna Islands has resulted in confrontations between 
Chinese and Indonesian authorities,131 although Indonesia maintains that it is not an official 
claimant in the SCS disputes. Indonesia announced plans in 2019 to open a fishing zone 
within and near the portion of its EEZ claimed by China to preserve national interests.132  
Chinese officials have also pushed domestic use of VMS through China’s Beidou 
satellite system, which Beijing touts as an alternative to the U.S. government’s GPS satellite 
constellation. According to Chinese reports, vessels in the South China Sea have had VMS 
installed with 90% of the cost covered by the Chinese government.133 In 2015, one-fourth of 
China’s offshore fishing vessels were estimated to be equipped with VMS.134 Government 
funding of VMS combined with substantial fuel subsidies aid fishermen as they pursue 
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fishing grounds further offshore toward and into contested waters.135    
 Following UN fisheries agreements in the 1990s, most regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMO) require VMS for fishing vessels.136 RFMOs are multilateral 
organizations that govern the majority of high seas and deep-sea fisheries but often suffer 
from inadequate governance and administration.137 There is currently no RFMO for the 
SCS;138 however, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), which 
was created to conserve and manage migratory fish stocks, does cover the SCS if regulated or 
targeted fish stocks migrate to the SCS.139 Nonetheless, its actual impact on SCS fisheries 
management is minimal.140 China is a member of the WCPFC and, as such, is required to 
submit to the WCPFC a record of all fishing vessels with authorization to fish outside of 
China’s jurisdiction and within the WCPFC convention area.141 Of the 3,935 vessels within 
the WCPFC fishing vessel database, 628 sail under the Chinese flag.142    
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Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite 
In a best-case scenario, authorities and researchers could collect and correlate both 
AIS and VMS data to monitor and understand fishing vessel activity. This would be 
particularly useful in instances of system malfunctions or outages, to detect activity patterns, 
and to determine unusual behavior and potential illegal activities. This ideal analysis is not 
possible in the SCS due to uneven system use and compliance; however, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and NASA’s jointly-flown VIIRS 
satellite sensor provides one of the most informative geospatial data sources for 
understanding fishing activity. This data helps fill the gaps in AIS and VMS coverage since 
not all fishing vessels are outfitted with AIS or VMS or they simply do not comply with 
regulations, often to hide illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activity. 
 VIIRS low-light imaging enables cloud detection for meteorological purposes using 
moonlight as opposed to sunlight for illumination.143 The additional applications of VIIRS 
are numerous and valuable across the natural and social sciences from the unintended ability 
of this system and its precursor to detect Earth surface lighting.144 VIIRS Day/Night Band 
(DNB) data also records non-electric light sources including lightning, burning biomass, and 
gas flares, for example.145 VIIRS night-time light imagery products are created through a 
series of filtering processes and are available to view and download as gray-scale images, 
typically within three hours of overflight by the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership 
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(SNPP) satellite.146 Every 24 hours, the SNPP satellite collects a complete set of night-time 
images of Earth.147 VIIRS data is particularly useful for understanding IUU fishing because 
even though VIIRS still detects non-fishing vessels at night such as commercial shipping 
vessels, many of those detected are commercial fishing vessels, often using bright lights to 
attract fish. The following figure displays cumulative VIIRS detections in 2018 as visualized 
by GFW and adapted by the author. 
  
Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SAR—unlike AIS and VMS, which require cooperative reporting by fishing 
vessels—is a type of radar that, like VIIRS, can be used to monitor vessels’ positions 
regardless of reporting status.148 SAR use for vessel detection and classification is well-
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Figure 7. Cumulative regional VIIRS night-light vessel detections: January-June 2018 (left) and July-
December 2018 (right). 





established,149 but classification of SAR detections has only recently been applied to fishing 
vessels. In one study this approach correlated closely with Global Fishing Watch’s fishing 
vessel presence data in the studied area.150 SAR images are created with microwave signals 
sent from sensor platforms (aircraft or satellites) to the ground; backscattered waves then 
reflect directly to the receiver on the same platform.151 This data sources is useful for 
understanding fishing vessel activity because SAR sensors function in all-weather types, 
penetrating cloud cover, during both day and night.152      
 SAR identifies metallic features, such as metal structures on fishing vessels, and can 
provide accurate counts of vessels down to six meters in overall length.153 Few vessel types 
are excluded from SAR but exceptions do exist, including traditional indigenous banca boats 
in the Philippines, which are constructed of wood by native boat builders.154 This means that 
while extensive fishing activity takes place around the Philippine Islands by Philippine 
fishermen, this activity appears minimal using geospatial data sources.  
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The Spratly Islands Case Study 
Using several types of geospatial data, including those discussed previously, Gregory 
Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies worked with Vulcan, 
Incorporated’s Skylight Maritime Initiative—which uses satellite and machine learning to 
promote maritime transparency—155 to analyze the size and behavior of fishing fleets near 
the Spratly Islands in the SCS.156 The Spratly Islands—an area that includes non-island 
features such as reefs and artificial islands—is hotly contested with claims by China, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.157 The CSIS report uses AIS, VIIRS, and 
SAR to monitor fishing activity around the Spratlys. According to the report, many fishing 
vessels in the SCS, particularly those originating in the Philippines and Vietnam do not 
feature AIS transceivers; these are often small or older vessels.158 Still other vessels featuring 
AIS transceivers do not broadcast in order to mask activity.159     
 A sample of AIS signals mapped by CSIS for June 2018 featured heavy vessel traffic 
on the periphery of the Spratlys but almost no activity within the island groups.160 In contrast, 
VIIRS boat detection products recorded significant fishing activity in the Spratlys from 
January 2013 to May 2018.161 CSIS found that both satellite-based SAR and VIIRS returned 
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similar findings in the Spratlys. In one example, CSIS detected 264 vessels in the Spratlys 
using SAR between September 30 and October 5, of which only eight were broadcasting 
AIS.162 While the SAR data alone cannot classify individual ships, other satellite imagery 
sources do identify the majority of vessels in the Spratlys as Chinese fishing vessels.163 
Poling uses this data to make the case that the Chinese government is operating an extensive 
paramilitary force and that most vessels in the Spratlys are members of this maritime 
militia.164 As noted by Asian security scholar Greg Austin, Poling connects overfishing by 
militia vessels to China’s military occupation of the Spratlys, including the destruction of 
reef environments to construct artificial islands.165 This connection may be problematic as it 
assumes China bears the greatest responsibility for overfishing in the South China Sea, 
basing this on statistics that reference the entire SCS rather than contested areas where 
fishing activity is comparatively minor.166 
Conclusion 
 China’s marine fisheries are an important component of China’s primary economic 
sector providing employment and livelihoods, food security, and products for trade for 
coastal communities. As fish stocks dwindle under continued pressure, China’s Bureau of 
Fisheries hopes to see unemployed fishermen seek work in aquaculture or processing; 
however, these sectors are less lucrative than fishing at sea—thus, interest for fishermen and 
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boat owners to sell their vessels and seek alternative employment is low.167 According to 
FAO estimates, close to 1.8 million fishing vessels operate in the SCS.168 This figure is 
nearly half of the world’s fishing vessels according to many estimates. The Philippines leads 
with the highest number of vessels operating in the SCS but the vast majority of these are 
small-scale vessels.169 Vietnam has the second highest number of vessels followed by China 
according to available data; however, China’s more capable fishing fleet dominates in terms 
of overall capacity in the region.170 Some analyses of China’s fleet size compare China’s 
total number of fishing vessels to those of neighboring states, which is misleading. 
Comparing fleets that operate in the SCS specifically produces a more accurate 
representation given that many Chinese fishing vessels operate outside the SCS.   
 Approximately 86% of the total number of fishing vessels that operate in the SCS are 
small-scale vessels.171 This implies that most fishing activity is confined to shallow nearshore 
coastal waters as opposed to the open sea. This relegates most vessels to coastal waters 
within their national EEZs. The visualizations of AIS and VIIRS data from GFW 
demonstrate this tendency, which is also corroborated by data from the SAU Project. 
 A geographic approach to analyzing the fisheries hypothesis as a possible motivation 
for China’s militarization of the SCS produces unique insights often lacking in other 
                                                          
167 Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, “Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: The People’s 
Republic of China,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, December 2017, 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/CHN/en. 
 
168 Simon Funge-Smith, Matthew Briggs, and Weimin Miao, “Regional Overview of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture in Asia and the Pacific 2012,” Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC) - FAO Regional Office 
for Asia and the Pacific, 2012, http://www.fao.org/3/i3185e/i3185e00.pdf. 
 
169 Funge-Smith, Briggs, and Miao, “Regional Overview of Fisheries and Aquaculture.” 
 
170 Funge-Smith, Briggs, and Miao, “Regional Overview of Fisheries and Aquaculture.” 
 




assessments. Refining data spatially helps avoid mischaracterizing information. The 
geospatial data provided in this thesis show that China’s fishing activity is concentrated 
mostly within China’s internationally-recognized EEZ and that China’s summer moratorium 
appears to be well-enforced. However, FAO data and academic studies also make clear that 
these same fish stocks are dangerously overfished. The importance of these fisheries to 
communities that rely on the marine catch and processing sectors is significant given China’s 
position as the world’s largest fish processer and producer. This has resulted in several key 
structural changes in China’s fishing industry including shifts to aquaculture, more offshore 
fishing, and more distant water fishing.172        
 In previous decades, China’s fishery sector was dominated by catch production. By 
2013, aquaculture instead accounted for 74% of China’s fishery production, a full reversal 
from 1978 when inland and marine catch accounted for 74% of production.173 
Simultaneously, China’s marine catch has moved from inshore to offshore fishing and 
China’s distant-water fishing (DWF) fleet has grown to become the largest in the world;174 
however, this is only in terms of vessel number and not actual capacity.175 China’s DWF fleet 
expansion is driven by fish stock depletion close to home. The fleet operates in more than 
forty EEZs, the Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic Ocean high seas and, increasingly, the Antarctic 
Ocean.176 Although China insists that its DWF fleet operates in conjunction with local 
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governments and enterprises and spurs local economic development, China has also been 
accused of contributing to fisheries depletion,177 particularly in African waters where China 
is responsible for significant IUU fishing.178      
 Various trends and data elements, taken independently or out of context, can either 
support or contradict the fisheries hypothesis. The absence of comprehensive, 
geographically-informed assessments and a reliance on striking figures alone to prove a point 
contribute to unbalanced approaches to the SCS disputes. Often, assessments and assertions 
of the fisheries hypothesis omit important details, such as the observation using AIS that 
most legal fishing occurs in nearshore waters rather than contested areas. This is backed up 
by FAO analyses on vessel numbers, capabilities, and types. Arguments that point strictly to 
the maritime militia too often neglect to consider that confrontations exist both in an outside 
of contested waters, that the Chinese government cannot necessarily control Chinese 
fishermen, and that China does not typically aid fishermen who are detained or harassed by 
neighboring countries (rather, fishermen are often penalized for their actions upon return to 
China).179           
 Efforts to reduce pressure on fisheries are complicated by contradictory policies, such 
as China’s substantial fuel subsidies and summer fishing moratoria. As fish stocks dwindle 
close to home, the fishing activity in contested waters will likely increase as many observers 
and scholars claim. However, attributing this to China’s strategic goals alone ignores the 
simple fact that fishing further offshore and in distant waters is becoming an economic 
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necessity for fishermen seeking to preserve their livelihoods. While geographic information 
alone cannot sufficiently test the fisheries hypothesis, the contextualized data cited within 
this assessment can offer a more nuanced view of the complex role fisheries play in the 













































THE SOUTH CHINA SEA’S HYDROCARBONS 
Introduction 
 An alternate explanation for China’s militarization of the South China Sea (SCS) is 
the drive to access and control hydrocarbons beneath the seafloor.180 For China, increasing 
domestic energy production is a high priority, stemming from concerns about high reliance 
on foreign energy to meet demand. In recent years, China became the world’s fifth highest 
producer of oil (including crude oil, other petroleum liquids, and biofuels) at five percent of 
the global production; however, China was the world’s second highest consumer of oil in 
2016 with thirteen percent of global consumption.181 Oil constitutes about twenty percent of 
China’s energy consumption182 and China surpassed the United States to become the world’s 
largest crude oil importer in 2017.183        
 Overall, however, China depends heavily on coal for energy. Coal creates greater 
pollution than any other competing energy source and generates high amounts of waste. In 
2012, coal comprised nearly 66 percent of China’s energy consumption.184 This high 
dependence on coal has cemented China’s position as the world leader in energy-related 
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carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. China has sought to reduce CO2 emissions and associated 
pollution under its 2014 climate change plan by diversifying sources to include cleaner 
energy forms such as natural gas—which currently accounts for about five percent of China’s 
energy consumption—and forms of renewable energy that do not raise CO2 emissions 
levels.185          
 China’s actions to assert control in the SCS impact other states involved in maritime 
jurisdiction disputes; however, competing territorial claims to islands and other features are 
mostly concentrated in areas with limited hydrocarbon potential. Still, each SCS claimant 
country has concerns regarding energy security. China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam are all net importers of oil; both Taiwan and the Philippines rely almost entirely 
on imported oil.186 Of the six official SCS territory claimants, only Brunei is a net oil 
exporter.187 According to the International Energy Agency, the Philippines188 and 
Vietnam189—the claimants most vocal against Chinese incursion—rely heavily on oil and 
minimally on natural gas proportionate to current national consumption. While Philippine 
and Vietnamese oil demand has increased, China has threatened force against these countries 
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and, reportedly, war if these countries explore and drill for oil in contested areas.190 
 Several key factors complicate an understanding of hydrocarbon-based conflict: a 
lack of reliable data, wide-ranging and contradictory resource and reserve estimates, and 
misuse of terminology. Without consistent, reliable, and current data, hydrocarbon potential 
in the SCS is difficult to estimate. The data cited in this chapter are commonly referenced by 
media and policy sources; however, many of these sources misinterpret, misuse, or conflate 
terms that are non-equivalent when referencing the data. The most authoritative hydrocarbon 
estimates are from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and Energy Information Agency 
(EIA) and were published within the 2010-2015 timeframe.191 Several more recent but less 
comprehensive Chinese sources will also be incorporated. In addition, satellite data yield 
insight into offshore drilling platforms in and outside of contested areas. This chapter seeks 
to clarify terminology used in the hydrocarbons hypothesis debate, to provide an overview of 
available data and literature on the SCS hydrocarbons and regional energy demands, and to 
contextualize the hydrocarbons hypothesis within a broad framework. 
The Hydrocarbons Hypothesis 
 In a 2013 testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
former RAND Corporation analyst and Department of Defense senior executive appointee 
Lloyd Thrall asserted that natural resources—emphasizing hydrocarbons—are often cited as 
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the primary drivers of conflict in the SCS, despite limited potential returns.192 One example 
comes from energy markets analyst Tim Daiss who often connects Chinese aggression to 
hydrocarbons—particularly oil—in the SCS. Daiss claims that oil is the reason why “the 
world’s newest super power and second largest economy” is willing “to jeopardize its 
reputation and standing with…its neighbors…and…[the] international community.”193 Daiss 
emphasizes that while China frames land reclamation, artificial island building, and 
aggressive and dangerous behavior within a popular national sovereignty narrative, the real 
cause for China’s actions lies in “what’s under the South China Sea, oil…”194   
 Scott Montgomery, a geoscientist and energy and international affairs analyst, 
similarly connects oil to Chinese militarization of the SCS. Montgomery notes that oil’s 
necessity lies in its lack of alternatives: “…oil constitutes the one energy source with no 
alternatives…it powers nearly every vehicle in use…No modern economy and no military 
can exist without it.”195 Montgomery points out that while China’s natural gas demand has 
grown, so has production due to vast domestic shale gas volumes.196 China has also invested 
heavily in alternatives to coal and natural gas; however, oil demand presents a different 
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concern due to rising demand and imports, combined with domestic production that 
plateaued between 2012 and 2015.197       
 Unlike Daiss and other contributors to the hydrocarbons hypothesis, Montgomery 
argues, like Thrall, that oil and other hydrocarbons are likely not overriding reasons for 
China’s military actions.198 Montgomery claims that he and other “informed sources” 
recognize that estimates from geologic studies are insufficient to justify Chinese risk of 
military conflict and breakdown of regional relations; rather, Montgomery contends that 
China’s “strategically excessive” oil and gas estimates are distractions from other motives, 
“such as territorial control.”199 These two examples present contradictory views of the 
hydrocarbons hypothesis. This chapter evaluates the data and literature that informs the 
hydrocarbons debate to better understand the role of hydrocarbons in the SCS conflict. 
Evaluating the Hydrocarbons Hypothesis 
 To appropriately evaluate the hydrocarbons hypothesis and avoid misunderstanding, 
it is important to define and discuss key terms and make several important distinctions. China 
and its regional neighbors rely heavily on nonrenewable sources of energy in the forms of 
coal, petroleum products from crude oil and natural gas liquids,200 and natural gas. Coal is 
used primarily for electricity and manufacturing; oil is primarily used for transportation and 
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manufacturing; and natural gas primarily is used for electricity, manufacturing, and heating. 
Petroleum products from crude oil and natural gas are often grouped in reporting simply as 
energy; however, this generality does not consider the varied end uses of these resources.201 
Most states bordering the SCS have substantial reserves of natural gas but still depend 
heavily on imported oil to meet transportation needs due to the limited ability of gas to 
substitute for petroleum-derived fuels.202    
Measuring, Locating, and Extracting Hydrocarbons 
 The standard volume unit for measuring crude oil is the 42-gallon barrel. Natural gas 
is measured in several ways, typically in volume at surface conditions or in thermal energy 
units. Standard cubic feet and meters are used at uniform conditions to measure natural gas, 
except for liquefied natural gas, which can be measured by volume because gas is 
compressible. Most natural gas estimates for the fields in the SCS are given in millions, 
billions, or trillions of cubic feet. These are standard measures for field reserves. Although 
the units for measuring oil and gas are distinct, gas reserves can be compared to oil based on 
energy content using barrels of oil equivalent (BOE). 
There are several essential geologic elements necessary for hydrocarbon 
accumulation. The most basic elements are reservoir rocks, source rocks, and a seal. More 
specifically, hydrocarbon accumulation requires a porous, permeable sedimentary reservoir, 
an organic-rich source rock, and a low permeability seal or capping rock to retain 
hydrocarbons.203 Over time and under certain conditions, organic matter (plant or animal 
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remains) can alter into liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons in source rocks—typically shales or 
limestones. Hydrocarbons in the forms of crude oil and natural gas accumulate in reservoir 
rocks—such as limestones, dolomites, and sandstones—that allow hydrocarbon extraction 
because of their porosity and permeability. Lastly, hydrocarbons must be sealed by a very 
low permeability or impermeable capping rock. These are the basic components of 
hydrocarbon accumulation but are by no means comprehensive. It is important, however, to 
recognize the key factors and conditions that enable hydrocarbon accumulation in the SCS to 
understand where accumulations are and are not feasible.     
 Finally, there is a distinction between the terms reserve and resource. Owen and 
Schofield note that some reporting on the SCS mistakenly uses these words interchangeably 
and yields unrealistic estimate perceptions.204 Defined simply, resources are hydrocarbons in 
situ whereas reserves are the proportion of those resources that can be extracted; typically, 
one-third of hydrocarbon resources can be technically extracted but only about one-tenth can 
be commercially extracted.205 This distinction is critical. High resource estimates in the SCS 
may not be inaccurate strictly speaking; however, these include, for example, unconventional 
gas hydrates that cannot be technically extracted at present. Reserves, in contrast, are the 
fraction of resources that can be recovered “at the current market price with current technical 
capability.”206 Distinguishing between hydrocarbon resources and reserves allows for a more 
realistic estimate of hydrocarbon capacity in the SCS. 
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Estimating the South China Sea’s Hydrocarbon Potential 
To meet rising demand, Chinese companies are investing in new extraction 
techniques to sustain oil flows at major mature fields while simultaneously developing 
untouched reserves offshore and in China’s western interior.207 Most of China’s crude oil 
production capacity is onshore; however, approximately twenty percent of production 
capacity is located in shallow offshore reserves.208 Although the SCS is richest in natural gas, 
Chinese state-owned oil companies have discovered small oil fields near shore and are 
investing in deep-water discovery.209 Significant deep-water exploration has been limited by 
ongoing disputes and clashes between China and other claimants in the SCS. Other 
impediments include weather. Since the SCS is very typhoon-prone, companies must install 
costly systems rather than cheaper rigid drilling and production platforms.210 Furthermore, 
the SCS’s bathymetry requires that producers install subsea pipelines in areas with submarine 
valleys as well as strong, deep water currents.211  
The U.S. Geological Survey’s World Petroleum Resources Assessment Project 
studied twenty-three hydrocarbon provinces in southeast Asia. Nine of these were in the 
SCS; eight were contested by one or more claimant state.212 Nonetheless, most reserves in the 
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SCS are found on the margins of the SCS in shallow water geologic basins.213 Despite 
ongoing disputes, several examples of bilateral cooperation exist. For example, Malaysia and 
Brunei settled disputes to jointly explore offshore.214 Both countries have limited onshore 
potential and, along with Vietnam, have invested heavily in offshore development.215 
Malaysia leads in terms of proved and probable reserves in the SCS with 5 billion barrels of 
crude oil and liquids reserves and 80 trillion cubic feet of natural gas; Brunei has 1.5 billion 
barrels of oil and 15 trillion cubic feet of natural gas; and Vietnam has 3 billion barrels of oil 
and 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.216 China follows with 1.3 billion barrels of oil and 15 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.217 Notably, Indonesia possesses 55 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas reserves.218         
 Overall, the combined proved and probable reserves219 in the SCS amount to 11.2 
billion barrels of crude oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (135 trillion cubic feet of 
which are owned by Malaysia and Indonesia in the southernmost portions of the SCS).220 
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Hydrocarbons may also exist in other areas but are not included in the figures for proved and 
probable reserves; these undiscovered resources amount to an estimated 12 billion barrels of 
oil and 160 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.221 One-fifth of these undiscovered resources are 
estimated in contested areas of the SCS; however, these hydrocarbons are not considered 
commercially recoverable and extraction may not be feasible.222    
 Whether or not these resources prove extractable in the future, it is useful to compare 
these to other high estimations. For example, the USGS published its largest continuous oil 
and gas resource estimates in 2018 for the Wolfcamp Shale and Bone Spring Formation in 
west Texas and southeast New Mexico. In these areas, the USGS estimated over 46 billion 
barrels of oil, 281 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 20 billion barrels of natural gas 
liquids to be undiscovered and technically recoverable.223 Compared to other major resource 
estimates, Chinese claims that the SCS presents a “second Persian Gulf” 224 in terms of 
hydrocarbon wealth appear exaggerated.   
 As of 2017, China produced under 5 million barrels of oil per day, consuming nearly 
13 million barrels daily in 2016;225 China imported 8.4 million barrels per day to meet this 
high consumption.226 Overall, annual Chinese oil consumption amounted to approximately 
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4.7 billion barrels in 2016. Extrapolating from this, if China managed to unilaterally extract 
all the proved and probable oil reserves—which, to reiterate, were estimated at 11.2 billion 
barrels in the SCS with the majority within other states’ territory—China would not even fuel 
its economy for 30 months at current consumption rates. Obviously, this theoretical situation 
would never occur. China could not extract all the estimated reserves in the SCS 
independently and already produces about 5 million barrels daily. However, this does 
demonstrate the limited ability of the SCS reserves to meet high demand. China will likely 
continue to be a net oil importer to meet demand for the foreseeable future.  
Conflicting Estimates 
Many hydrocarbon estimates for the SCS considered most authoritative are geology-
based given the absence of well log data and seismic surveys typically used to produce these 
estimates.227 This is due to the reality that exploration efforts have been impeded by 
competing claims in much of the SCS.228 Furthermore, existing hydrocarbon estimates vary 
widely. As summarized by the EIA: Wood Mackenzie, an energy consultancy group, 
estimated 2.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent in proved (1P) oil and gas reserves; the EIA 
estimated approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 
proved and probable (2P) reserves; the USGS estimated a possible 5-22 billion barrels of oil 
and 70-290 cubic feet of natural gas in undiscovered, non-commercial resources; and finally, 
the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) estimated 125 billion barrels of oil 
and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in undiscovered resources.229    
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 Chinese estimates are consistently higher than other available estimates and are often 
dismissed as unrealistic and overly optimistic.230 A 2015 article by the China Institute of 
International Studies cited expert Chinese estimates of oil and gas reserves in the main basins 
of the SCS as amounting to nearly 71 billion tons.231 Oil accounted for over 29 billion tons 
(of which 2 billion tons were proven to be extractable) and 58 trillion cubic meters of natural 
gas (of which 4 trillion cubic meters were proven to be extractable).232 In standard barrels, 
the 29 billion ton estimate would amount to nearly 214 billion barrels. This would mean the 
SCS contains the world’s third largest reserves capable of sustaining China for sixty years, 
when combined with the natural gas estimates, if the full estimated amount could be 
extracted.233 The China Institute of International Studies report went on to cite USGS, EIA, 
and other Chinese estimates, acknowledging that estimates diverged “…slightly due to a lack 
of adequate prospecting.”234          
 The Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) provides one of the most commonly-
referenced, comprehensive, publicly-available geographic datasets on oil and gas deposits 
around the world, both on and offshore. These data include spatial information (latitude and 
longitude coordinates) based on the center point of known deposits, resource type (oil, gas, or 
both oil and gas), discovery and production dates (if known), petroleum basin name, and 
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sources of information.235 For context throughout this chapter, the PRIO offshore deposit 
data is displayed for the SCS; China’s nine-dash line as generalized by the author based on 
Chinese maps, EEZs, and the SCS boundary extent (excluding the Gulf of Thailand) have 




Oceanic crust stretching from southwestern Taiwan to the western Spratly Islands 
encompasses much of the central SCS and effectively rules out the possibility of hydrocarbon 
discovery.237 Chinese government and national oil company (NOC) funded research agree 
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Figure 8. Oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea. 
Source: Offshore Petroleum Fields in the South China Sea [map]. March 2019. 
1:15,000,000; generated by the author using ArcGIS Version 10.6. 
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that most deposits are located near the margins of the SCS in sedimentary basins. One such 
study on hydrocarbon accumulation in the southern SCS determined that the greatest 
recoverable oil and gas resources (2P recoverable and undiscovered resources) were located 
in four main sedimentary basins close to the coasts of Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam.238 The 
boundaries of these basins as presented by the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) researchers were mostly outside the extent of the nine-dash line. CNOOC 
researchers have published similar findings—that is, that most hydrocarbon-prone regions 
are on the continental margins of the SCS, but that exploration of more deep water areas 
could yield significant findings.239 SCS reserves in millions of barrels of oil equivalent in the 
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Notably, of the nine major known hydrocarbon provinces identified in the USGS report, only 
the Pearl River Mouth Basin (PRMB) is not subject to competing claims and is claimed only 
by China.240 This area has been explored and developed by Chinese and foreign companies; 
most of its sedimentary environments and their hydrocarbon reserves and potential are well-
understood. Significantly for China, the PRMB is considered the most petroliferous basin in 
the northern SCS.241 
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Figure 9. Proved and probable reserves of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea given in 
million barrels of oil equivalent. 
Source: South China Sea 2P Reserves [map]. March 2019. 1:15,000,000; generated by the 
author using ArcGIS Version 10.6. 
58 
 
Offshore Drilling and Sovereignty in the South China Sea 
 As noted in the previous chapter, fishing vessels play a role in asserting maritime 
territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. Offshore drilling platforms serve a similar 
purpose as more semi-permanent fixtures in maritime space. At the end of their production 
life, offshore platforms are typically removed by explosive or mechanical means but both 
Brunei and Malaysia notably convert some decommissioned platforms to artificial reefs to 
protect fish and invertebrates.242 Other abandoned and active platforms near disputed 
boundaries can serve to fuel regional tensions.243      
 Opposition to offshore drilling from China, primarily from the Philippines and 
Vietnam, has ranged from Chinese pressure to expel foreign firms to threats of attack and 
war.244 The last major attempt at trilateral cooperation was the Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking (JMSU), which began in 2005 and expired in 2008.245 The JMSU was initiated 
by a circle of Filipino politicians, bureaucrats, and political insiders with mixed motivations 
ranging from improving energy security to obtaining Chinese investment and procuring 
profitable business deals with Chinese companies.246 Vietnam eventually agreed to join the 
JMSU despite fierce domestic opposition, not wanting to be excluded from the initiative’s 
discoveries.247 Three national oil companies from China, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
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committed to cooperate on seismic surveys of approximately 140,000 square kilometers of 
maritime territory around the contested Spratly Islands.248 CNOOC conducted surveys; 
PetroVietnam processed data along with an American company; and the Philippine National 
Oil Company organized analysis.249 In the end, the JMSU fell apart largely due to corruption 
charges, popular opposition, and constitutional challenges in the Philippines. Since the 
expiration of the JMSU in 2008, no serious attempts at joint development have been made 
between three or more claimant states. Successful examples of bilateral cooperation since the 
collapse of the JMSU come from the southern SCS. In 2015, Malaysia and Brunei’s NOCs 
announced the joint development of two oil fields on their maritime boundary.250 This was 
possible as Malaysia and Brunei enjoy comparatively friendly relations in contrast to other 
SCS claimant states.251  
The 2014 China-Vietnam Oil Rig Standoff Case Study 
 Since the failure of the JMSU to achieve lasting cooperation, Chinese fishing boats 
and law enforcement vessels have impeded Vietnamese seismic survey efforts by 
intimidating survey ships and severing their seismic cables.252 Most controversially, CNOOC 
deployed a semisubmersible drilling rig, the Hai Yang Shi You (HYSY 981), to waters 120 
nautical miles off Vietnam’s east coast—solidly within Vietnam’s 200 nautical mile EEZ—
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for three months in 2014.253 The HYSY 981 deployment was 180 miles south of China’s 
Hainan island province, falling within the maximum hypothetical EEZ entitlements of both 
Vietnam and China.254 These overlapping rights have not been resolved between the two 
states.255          
 China’s coordinated effort was planned well in advance of HYSY 981’s deployment. 
The CNOOC chairman had declared the billion-dollar HYSY 981 a strategic weapon in the 
SCS for Beijing two years before the rig was deployed to Vietnamese-claimed territory,256 
also labeling it as a tool of “mobile sovereignty.”257 Although CNOOC was at first reluctant 
to expand into the SCS, it changed its position when other domestic NOC competitors 
obtained permits to explore the SCS in 2004.258 Nonetheless, expansion was an uncertain 
venture for CNOOC which, as a publicly-listed corporation since 2001, had to take business 
interests into consideration before exploring in contested waters.259 Such exploits would be 
too hazardous without strong state backing, especially given CNOOC’s relative lack of 
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experience in deep water operations and speculative prospects in the SCS.260 Ultimately, with 
both competition concerns and a growing need for market expansion under pressures of 
rising demand, CNOOC lobbied the Chinese government for SCS exploration support in the 
name of defending territorial sovereignty.261 Ultimately, CNOOC was successful in its efforts 
to align its business interests with the state’s maritime interests.262 
While CNOOC explored for oil, the China Maritime Safety Administration 
provocatively declared that no ships could enter within a three-nautical-mile radius of HYSY 
981.263 This was an increase from a previous radius of one-nautical-mile. Standoffs and 
collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese vessels prompted China to expand its declared 
security cordon to five, 10, and 15 nautical miles while demonstrations and protests against 
China broke out in Vietnam.264 China evacuated over 3,000 Chinese citizens from Vietnam 
after several were killed and more than 100 injured.265 China’s foreign ministry repeatedly 
claimed that Vietnam’s attempts to interrupt drilling activities violated Chinese 
sovereignty.266 In its 2015 annual report to Congress, the U.S. Office of the Secretary of 
Defense characterized HYSY 981 as a “sovereignty marker.”267 Ultimately, China’s 
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disregard for Vietnam’s EEZ sent a clear message.268 Nonetheless, CNOOC withdrew HYSY 
981 a month ahead of schedule and returned to the northwestern SCS.269 While CNOOC 
claimed the withdrawal of HYSY 981 was in accordance with previous plans and had 
“nothing to do with any external factor,” it has not crossed to Vietnam’s side of the disputed 
median line since 2014, causing some to declare the incident a major coercive failure on 
China’s part.270 
Hydrocarbon Exploration Activity in the South China Sea 
 The 2014 HYSY 981 incident serves as a prime example of Chinese sovereignty 
assertion and aggression in publications on the SCS. Overall, however, the extent of 
hydrocarbon exploration activity in the SCS is poorly known and estimates of offshore 
platforms in the SCS vary widely. Although countries engaged in offshore drilling, offshore 
energy producers, and platform producers are certainly aware of their own platforms, many 
do not make this information available to protect business and national security interests.271 
Chinese government-supported research used U.S., Chinese, and Japanese satellite imagery 
and data to determine the number of offshore platforms in the SCS.272 This research aimed at 
clarifying the number of platforms in the SCS and their spatial distribution relying primarily 
on satellite data freely available online, including the U.S. Visible Infrared Imaging 
Radiometer Suite nighttime lights products and Landsat-8 imagery.273    
                                                          
268 Fanell, “China’s Maritime Sovereignty Campaign,” 109. 
 
269 Green et al., “Counter-coercion Series.” 
 
270 Green et al., “Counter-coercion Series.” 
 
271 Yongxue Liu et al., “Satellite Data Lift the Veil on Offshore Platforms in the South China Sea,” 
Scientific Reports 6, no 33623 (2016): 1, doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/srep33623. 
 
272 Liu et al., “Satellite Data Lift the Veil on Offshore Platforms,” 9. 
273 Liu et al., “Satellite Data Lift the Veil on Offshore Platforms,” 2. 
63 
 
 The study concluded that 1,082 offshore installations were located in the SCS, 
including the Gulf of Thailand and other areas outside China’s nine-dash line.274 These were 
primarily small installations for shallow-water production rather than large, billion-dollar, 
deep water drilling rigs like HYSY 981. Over 95 percent of platforms identified were in 
shallow water areas; the largest groupings of platforms were found in the Gulf of Thailand 
and the southern SCS outside the geographic extent of the nine-dash line.275 Excluding non-
claimant states, Malaysia had the most platforms (356) in or near the SCS followed by 
Brunei (166), Vietnam (91), China (76), and the Philippines (8).276 The authors postulated 
that previous estimates of offshore platforms ranging from just under 1,300 to over 1,500—
figures substantially higher than the 1,082 actually identified—were inaccurate largely due to 
data availability factors and inclusion of platforms located geographically outside the 
boundaries of the SCS.277 Although the majority of platforms identified were outside of 
contested areas, the Chinese study found 90 platforms in areas with overlapping claims and 
predicted this number could rise to 120 by 2020 based on average increases per year, 
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 This assessment of the hydrocarbons hypothesis as a possible explanation for China’s 
militarization of the SCS exposes several important trends. First, China’s demand for 
hydrocarbons is rising. Relying on imports is a major concern for China as it seeks to 
improve energy security by depending less on foreign sources. Chinese exploration in the 
SCS near and within contested waters is not altogether surprising. The combination of 
Chinese military infrastructure in the SCS and the nearby mainland make the SCS a strategic 
option for hydrocarbon development to meet domestic needs.279 Second, while Chinese 
exploration of the SCS is understandable strategically, its potential may be limited. 
Uncontested coastal areas that already produce hydrocarbons contain the majority of proven 
reserves; hydrocarbon potential in contested, deep water areas is largely hypothetical.280 
Third, most scholars and analysts whose work has been considered herein do not propose the 
hydrocarbon hypothesis as a singular explanation for the SCS conflicts or for China’s 
militarization of the SCS. Rather, this argument is made primarily by media sources and 
some think tanks. Nontechnical sources frequently overstate the significance of estimates, 
conflating 1P, 2P, and 3P estimates and often cite the sum of reserve and resource 
estimates.281 This can be highly misleading. In comparison, most analysts and scholars 
conclude that hydrocarbon competition is not the dominant factor—if such a factor exists—
behind the SCS disputes.282         
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 As Montgomery summarized pointedly: “…Chinese perception of the SCS as a 
security concern has led to an erosion of security in the region. One other point should be 
made in this regard: oil and gas resources in the SCS are not likely an overriding reason for 
China’s actions. Continued focus on this idea in some quarters isn’t warranted.”283 Assuming 
optimistic estimates for the SCS hydrocarbon reserves in terms of forecasted production 
rates, the SCS oil reserves do not have the capacity to significantly improve regional energy 
security and address China’s concerns regarding import reliance.284 In contrast, conventional 
gas reserves could benefit SCS countries in the medium to long term based on production 
rate forecast analyses.285 As far as China is concerned, however, natural gas is a far less 
significant component of domestic energy needs than oil. Since oil is the essential fuel for the 
transportation sector, it is irreplaceable in the medium term—particularly as China’s oil 
demand continues to grow.286  
 While debate over the hydrocarbons hypothesis will likely continue as competition 
intensifies and future exploration either supports or undermines major arguments, China’s 
goals can be better understood by studying the role of hydrocarbons in the SCS disputes. The 
near absence of oil and gas reserves surrounding China’s major militarized features implies 
that China has other objectives beyond accessing hydrocarbons.287 According to hydrocarbon 
industry sources, the areas around the contested Spratly Islands likely contain almost no oil 
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and less than 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas while the areas around the Paracel Islands 
have no oil and even less natural gas.288  
Although oil and natural gas exploration and the infrastructure that accompanies these 
efforts play significant roles in asserting sovereignty claims, China and other claimant states 
also have significant energy needs combined with competition. China’s actions in the SCS 
cannot be viewed strictly as strategic moves since practical considerations of meeting energy 
demand also exist. Recognizing the multiple sides of hydrocarbon extraction efforts is critical 
















                                                          







THE SOUTH CHINA SEA’S SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION 
Introduction 
Sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are the final possible motivation for China’s 
militarization of the South China Sea (SCS) considered in this thesis. SLOCs are important 
maritime passageways that “facilitate heavy shipping traffic volumes and host the 
transportation of key maritime trades such as crude oil;” they are characterized “by the 
intensity of their use and narrow passages or ‘chokepoints’ that require ships to navigate 
cautiously when passing through…”289 Incidents along SLOCs or near chokepoints can 
disrupt shipping traffic flows, impacting regional economic interests and global trade.290 The 
SCS is home to some of the world’s busiest shipping routes with an estimated one-third of 
global shipping passing through the SCS each year.291 This includes over half the world’s 
merchant ships by tonnage and half the world’s oil tankers annually.292 Overall, 
approximately 80 percent of global trade by volume is handled by maritime transport.293 This 
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rises to 90 percent for developing countries.294       
 For China and other states that depend on the SCS SLOCs for trade, any disruption 
could be devastating to shipping. Shipping is a very competitive industry with small profit 
margins; longer trips would result in fewer annual voyages and higher fuel costs that could 
ruin shipping companies.295 Alternative shipping routes that are more dangerous and pose 
greater risk result in higher insurance premiums.296 Thus, the need for open and safe SLOCs 
through the SCS is significant, especially for those states whose economies are most 
dependent on the SCS. Already, commercial shipping in the SCS faces threats from extreme 
weather, complex submarine topography, and piracy and armed robbery.297  
 Analysis of data from the International Comprehensive Ocean Atmosphere Data Set 
(ICOADS) from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—
which maintains the largest available set of historic to recent marine observations—reveals 
two major shipping routes that pass through the SCS.298 One passes through the Taiwan 
Strait along China’s southeastern coast to Hong Kong, a major commercial port city.299 This 
route then turns southwest toward Singapore.300 The other major route, which passes directly 
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through the SCS, goes through the western Pacific on the eastern Taiwan coast; it then passes 
through the Bashi Channel or Luzon Strait between southern Taiwan and the northern 
Philippines and then southwest toward Singapore.301 Both major routes then merge in the 
central SCS near 111°E, 11°N and then pass through the Singapore and Malacca Straits, into 
the Indian Ocean.302 The Strait of Malacca is the most heavily-used entry point to the SCS 
and presents the most economical connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.303 For 
reference, one year of shipping activity is provided in Figure 10 below to visualize the 
amount of shipping traffic passing through the SCS in comparison to the rest of the world.304 
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Figure 10. 2013 global shipping activity. 
Source: Cumulative Global Shipping Activity: 2013 [map]. March 2019. 
1:100,000,000 (South China Sea inset 1:50,000); generated by the author 
using ArcGIS Version 10.6.  
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Other major routes into the SCS include the Sunda Strait between the Indonesian 
islands of Java and Sumatra, the Lombok Strait between the Indonesian islands of Bali and 
Lombok, or a long voyage around Australia.305 If the Malacca and Sunda Straits closed, the 
estimated cost to reroute shipping traffic through the Lombok Strait for one week would be 
approximately $119 million.306 Both the Sunda and Lombok Straits are near “currently active 
and very dangerous explosive volcanoes,” which could impact insurance premiums and, 
potentially, navigability in the event of volcanic eruptions.307 If, however, all major straits 
and other possible SLOCs in the region closed, shipping vessels would have to sail around 
Australia and then northward to the Philippine Sea with an estimated additional monthly cost 
of $2.8 billion.308 This is a worst-case scenario, but one that necessitates consideration in 
case all other entries to the SCS are disrupted. This possible disruption—usually attributed to 
Chinese aggression and regional conflict—is the major concern proponents of the SLOC 
hypothesis raise, arguing that China’s intention to control major shipping lanes has driven 
China’s military actions in the SCS. 
The Sea Lines of Communication Hypothesis 
 A “popular view” in SCS literature is that China is a threat to global trade, either 
through an outbreak of conflict that could render the SCS unnavigable for commercial 
shipping vessels or through China’s potential to use its military infrastructure in the SCS to 
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“interdict commercial shipping.”309 Writing for the New York Times, journalist and 
international affairs analyst Max Fisher claims that while fisheries, oil, and natural gas 
contribute to the SCS’s strategic importance, the greatest value the SCS presents is as a trade 
route, citing $5.3310 trillion in overall goods passing through the SCS each year including 
$1.2 trillion of U.S. trade.311 Fisher then notes a “core contradiction” in the SCS dispute: the 
dispute is driven by territorial competition while all countries involved want and rely upon 
open sea routes.312 Each country benefits from the free flow of goods and each would suffer 
from disruption.313 Factoring the United States into the equation, Fisher writes that the 
United States stresses free navigation and does not want to allow China the possibility of 
holding the “global economy hostage,” acknowledging that China is unlikely to want to close 
off trade in the first place, but that China suspects the status quo is “engineered to serve 
Western interests first.”314          
 Asian financial markets analyst Peter Pham, like Fisher, also mentions fisheries, oil, 
and natural gas in passing, but emphasizes the importance of trade to explain rising tensions 
in the SCS. Pham writes in response to the Trump administration’s fourth freedom of 
navigation operation (FONOP) in the SCS, calling the operation the “latest activity in a 
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multi-dimensional chess game” where “the smallest miscalculation...could have huge 
consequences for trillions of dollars in trade and billions of lives, not just in the immediate 
vicinity but around the globe…”315 Pham reiterates that conflict in the SCS is not a 
contemporary phenomenon; however, the new concern in the SCS is the impact military 
action will have on global trade.316       
 One final example of the SLOC hypothesis comes from Asian finance and politics 
writer Anthony Fensom. Fensom wrote that while China is the major beneficiary of free 
shipping routes in the SCS, other nations are similarly dependent and any escalation of 
conflict would lead to the breakdown of trade in “one of the world’s last remaining regions of 
economic dynamism.”317 Like many others, Fensom wrote in response to the July 12, 2016 
ruling against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, an 
international body constituted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
In the unanimous The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China ruling, 
the tribunal found “no evidence” that China historically exerted exclusive control over the 
SCS waters and their resources, concluding that China has no legal basis to claim “historic 
rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line.’”318 China’s 
emphatic rejection of the ruling amplified concerns of conflict in the SCS that could disrupt 
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trade. With this understanding of the SLOC hypothesis and background information, the 
remainder of this chapter will evaluate this explanation for China’s actions. 
Evaluating the Sea Lines of Communication Hypothesis 
  Several key factors identified in literature on the SCS complicate an understanding of 
the SLOC hypothesis. To clarify these factors, this chapter evaluates several of the major 
perspectives on the current international order and international trade; considers statistics on 
trade volume in the SCS; examines China’s energy security concerns and the Malacca 
Dilemma; and discusses the role of free trade agreements in the SCS region.   
The World Order and Economic Interdependence 
Scholars often reference a rules-based international liberal order (ILO) that originated 
toward the end of World War II and has since been led by the West, particularly the United 
States; this order is characterized by “economic openness, multilateral institutions, security 
cooperation and democratic solidarity.”319 It is primarily maintained through global 
organizations including the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that promote problem-solving, cooperation, and 
economic stability.320 In the 20th century, the United States established itself as the hegemon 
in the Asia-Pacific though military and economic dominance and a system of alliances and 
partnerships.321 More recently, China’s rapidly growing economy and  increasingly powerful 
military has initiated what international relations theorist G. John Ikenberry considers a 
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regional power transition.322 Ikenberry writes that after long operating outside the ILO, China 
now works within it to dominate a region now interconnected through trade, investment, and 
multilateralism.323 Nonetheless, some see China as a potential existential threat to the ILO. 
For example, in the United States, the White House has raised concerns that a reemergence 
of great power competition is driven by Russia and China as they seek to reshape the liberal 
order.324 While the White House’s National Security Strategy pointed to “revisionist powers” 
China and Russia that “want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests,” 325 
others point to rising nationalism, protectionism, and unilateralism in the West, including the 
United States, as factors that undermine the liberal order. 
 Many scholars and policy analysts view China as a beneficiary of the ILO. The 
debates over the extent to which China will further integrate into the ILO and the degree to 
which economic interdependence inhibits or encourages war are not the focus of this chapter; 
however, a general understanding of the prevailing views helps inform an analysis of the 
SLOC hypothesis. Some claim that there is little evidence to show that Beijing has joined 
“rules-based institutions in order to misbehave and undermine them,” and that it is unlikely 
that Beijing would seek to overturn the organizations and laws to which it has either acceded 
or contributed.326 Benjamin Herscovitch, a Beijing-based writer and policy analyst, claims 
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that China supports and abides by international institutions and norms in most arenas, such as 
global trade where China has demonstrated leadership in bilateral and multilateral free trade 
agreements and membership in the WTO.327 Herscovitch asserts that notwithstanding 
“Beijing’s behavior in the SCS, China is overall a strong supporter of the current 
international order.”328 
Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate regarding economic interdependence, which 
is a key issue for trading states who rely on the SCS for unimpeded export and import traffic. 
The most prominent view among world politics scholars is that trade is a pacifying force.329 
This perspective appears to undermine the SLOC hypothesis, or at the very least, appears 
incompatible with the notion that China would disrupt trade routes in the SCS. International 
relations scholar and theorist Dale Copeland summarized the liberal and realist views on the 
causes of war, claiming that economic interdependence is the only causal factor common to 
both views.330 Liberals, according to Copeland, argue that economic interdependence lowers 
the likelihood of war; realists instead claim that high interdependence increases the 
likelihood of war.331 Unsatisfied with the prevailing liberal and realist views, Copeland 
introduced the theory of trade expectations. This theory incorporates a new variable—
expectations of future trade—that when combined with a state’s level of dependence can be 
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used to determine the conditions under which high interdependence may lead to peace or 
war.332 In Copeland’s theory, high interdependence can induce peace if states anticipate high 
future trade levels; however, if a state is highly dependent at one point, but anticipates low 
future trade levels, conflict may appear more attractive if its “expected value is greater than 
peace.”333 Copeland introduced his theory in the mid-1990s but applied it more recently to 
great power conflict, including the example of the United States and China in his 2014 book 
Economic Interdependence and War. Ikenberry summarized Copeland’s argument regarding 
China: China’s leaders are confident that oil and trade flows will remain stable and open; 
however, this could change if the United States seeks to contain and economically coerce 
China.334            
Trade Volume in the SCS 
In terms of exports, China depended most heavily on the SCS with $874 billion in 
exports passing through the SCS in 2016 down from $901 billion in 2015.335 In 2016, South 
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam followed China with $249, $214, $170, and $158 
billion in exports transiting the SCS respectively, demonstrating the importance of these 
trade routes to Asian states.336 In comparison, the United States’ exports accounted for 2 
percent of total SCS exports at $83 billion.337 Export figures only reflect a portion of overall 
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trade. In total, the estimated global amount of trade passing through the SCS was nearly $3.4 
trillion in 2016, which is substantially lower than the frequently-cited figure of over $5 
trillion.338  
In imports, China also depended most on the SCS, reflecting the demand of the 
world’s most populous country as well as China’s integration into the global economy. China 
imported $598 billion in products in 2016 but when including Hong Kong,339 this figure rises 
to $828 billion.340 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) China Power 
Project obtained the $3.4 trillion trade figure using commercial shipping routes, automatic 
identification system (data) from ships, and bilateral trade flows as well as statistics from the 
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. This estimate stands in contrast to the often-cited $5.3 
trillion figure with nebulous origins. Writing for The Diplomat, Ankit Panda claimed that the 
$5.3 trillion figure first appeared in 2010 in remarks by Admiral Robert F. Willard, then-U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command Commander, and gradually entered common use, “becoming an 
important piece of conventional wisdom on the South China Sea, helping outline the region’s 
geopolitical and economic salience.”341 In late-2011, Willard repeated his claim saying the 
SCS SLOCs carry $5.3 trillion in annual bilateral trade of which $1.2 trillion is U.S. trade, 
making the SCS sea lines a vital concern to the region, the United States, and U.S. partners 
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and allies.342 Willard also emphasized that the United States has maintained its presence in 
the vicinity of those SLOCs to ensure security and stability in the SCS.343 Although recent 
studies like the CSIS report have demonstrated the $5.3 trillion figure to be overinflated, the 
core idea that the SCS is of critical importance to regional and global economies remains.344 
Energy Security 
 The previous chapter on hydrocarbons in the SCS underlined the economic 
importance of oil and natural gas. This significance makes energy security—the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price—345 the most important 
element of free navigation in the SCS for many countries. While global annual tanker trade, 
which includes crude oil and petroleum products, has declined marginally, crude oil 
comprised the largest portion of all international seaborne trade in 2014.346 Crude oil trade 
destined for Asia and largely driven by Chinese demand increased in recent years; this was 
due in part to China’s increasing capacity to refine crude oil.347     
 As a percentage of world market share in 2014, the Asia-Pacific region produced only 
9 percent of oil while Western Asia and North America dominated at 43 and 19 percent 
respectively. In terms of consumption, the Asia-Pacific region led oil consumption at 35 
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percent overall, followed by North America at 23 percent.348 While the region is heavily 
dependent on outside sources for crude oil, the Asia-Pacific notably led the world in oil 
refinery capacities at 35 percent.349 Asia-Pacific natural gas consumption was also high in 
2017 at 21 percent; the region’s production as a share of the world market was also closer to 
its demand at 17 percent.350 China’s environmental agenda (discussed in the previous 
chapter), weather conditions, and stronger demand drove China’s astonishing 2017 increase 
in natural gas imports of over 47 percent; the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) projects that China’s future imports of natural gas will continue to 
rise.351           
 Regional and Chinese needs for energy security drive overall energy resource 
shipping, though reliance on the SCS SLOCs for energy shipments goes beyond the SCS 
territorial claimants. In 2016, 30 percent of global maritime crude oil trade passed through 
the SCS with 90 percent passing through the Strait of Malacca.352 China was the top importer 
at 42 percent of this total crude oil trade followed by Japan at 20 percent and South Korea at 
18 percent; the top five exporters with 59 percent of oil trade passing through the SCS in 
2016 were all Middle Eastern states led by Saudi Arabia.353 An even greater percentage of 
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global liquefied natural gas (LNG)354 trade passed through the SCS in 2016 at nearly 40 
percent.355 Japanese LNG imports led with a high 42 percent followed by South Korea, 
China, and Taiwan at 22, 17, and 15 percent each.356 Oman was the highest exporter of LNG 
through the SCS but was followed by SCS claimant Malaysia at 24 percent and regional 
power Australia at 10 percent.357 More than two-thirds of China’s and over 90 percent of 
Taiwan’s LNG imports sailed through the SCS in 2016; total Chinese LNG imports more 
than doubled since 2011, though over half of this growth was destined for northern Chinese 
ports and did not pass through the SCS.358 By 2040, China is projected to import as much 
LNG as Japan, currently the world’s largest LNG importer.359 
A 2000 RAND Corporation report assessed that China’s foreign oil dependency and 
net oil importer status presented the Chinese government with a severe national security 
concern, and that China viewed the United States as its greatest threat to energy security.360 
The report concluded that even with proposed pipeline construction plans, China would still 
not obtain enough oil to match its needs in the next two decades—that is, by 2020—and that 
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China would still rely on U.S.-protected sea-lanes for future energy security.361 The RAND 
report’s prediction that China would continue to depend on foreign oil held true. China is still 
a net oil importer and its economy has expanded rapidly since 2000. According to the World 
Bank, China’s 2000 gross domestic product (GDP) was $1.2 trillion in current U.S. dollars; 
by 2017, that figure had risen to 12.2 trillion U.S. dollars.362  
In 2017, Samir Tata, founder of International Political Risk Analytics, argued that 
energy security was Beijing’s highest strategic priority.363 Tata emphasized China’s goal to 
connect via pipelines and land-based infrastructure with friendly hydrocarbon-producing 
countries to meet its needs to reduce its dependence on tanker imports traveling along SLOCs 
through chokepoints controlled by the U.S. Navy.364 Tata claimed that a naval blockade to 
cut off energy imports would paralyze China’s military, trigger an economic collapse, and 
reduce China to a “paper dragon.”365 Tata estimated that China would likely achieve energy 
security before 2040 through its strategy to bypass the global military commons through 
overland crude oil pipelines—commercial shipping routes—as a non-military solution to 
U.S. global naval dominance.366 If this is achieved as projected, the SLOC hypothesis may 
weaken as an explanation for China’s military actions in the SCS. 
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The Malacca Dilemma 
 China depends on foreign oil, including significant crude oil shipments from the 
Middle East and Africa that sail through the SCS, out of necessity. These key supply sources 
motivate China to maintain friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran and while China has 
been criticized for “dragging its feet” on UN sanctions against Iran, China continues these 
ties nonetheless, underscoring its “pragmatic economic policies.”367 Oil from the Middle East 
and Africa is shipped through the Indian Ocean to the SCS via the Malacca or Lombok 
straits.368 China views these routes as strategic vulnerabilities, particularly the Strait of 
Malacca.369 According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, approximately 80 percent of 
China’s crude oil imports must pass through the strait.370 In 2003, former Chinese president 
Hu Jintao claimed that “certain major powers” were working to control the Strait of 
Malacca.371 Jintao’s concerns about a “Malacca Dilemma” continue to resonate leaving 
China with three possible solutions identified by Ian Storey of the Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies during the Jintao administration: reduce import dependence through energy 
efficiency and alternatives, construct pipelines that allow China to bypass the Strait of 
Malacca, or control China’s SLOCs through increased naval power and capabilities.372 To 
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varying degrees, China has pursued each of these strategies under current Chinese president 
Xi Jinping.            
 China is working to improve its energy security through efforts to reduce demand and 
expand supply. China has sought to control its oil demand by setting energy use reduction 
targets and diversifying its energy mix.373 By expanding national oil companies, diversifying 
sources and routes for oil supply, and strengthening the Chinese naval forces to better protect 
critical SLOCs, China has improved its energy security since Jintao’s administration. 
Simultaneously, however, Chinese demand for foreign energy sources has increased. Xi’s 
Belt and Road initiative for infrastructure and trade development uses government loans and 
state-owned or backed enterprise investments to develop linkages between China, other 
Asian states, the Middle East and Africa, and Europe.374 These include deep-water ports and 
oil and gas pipelines funded through loans that developing economies cannot always repay; 
these loans have been termed a form of debt-trap diplomacy whereby China leverages its 
creditor role to coerce other states into “ceding control over strategically important ports, 
resources, and commercial routes.”375  
 China’s first major pipeline project opened in Myanmar in 2017. Myanmar is not a 
major oil producer—rather, the pipeline allows China to bypass the Strait of Malacca. This 
project allows crude oil tankers from the Middle East and Africa to offload their shipments at 
a man-made island on Myanmar’s coast in the Bay of Bengal.376 The oil is then piped across 
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Myanmar into western China ending in China’s Yunnan province.377 In addition, China has 
also increased cooperation with Russia on energy. Russia is a top producer of natural gas, 
following the United States, and Beijing’s focus on reducing pollution from its high use of 
coal has prompted increasing demand for natural gas. Currently, Russia’s Power of Siberia 
natural gas pipeline is nearing completion and may bring gas to China by the end of 2019. 
The pipeline project’s 30-year contract between Russian and Chinese state-owned 
corporations stipulates that Russia will supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually to 
China.378 Although the Malacca Dilemma is often discussed in writings on China’s energy 
security and the SCS SLOCs, it is also important to recognize some of the steps China is 
taking—such as investment in overland pipelines—to counterbalance the risks associated 
with heavy dependence on SLOCs and their chokepoints. 
Free Trade Agreements 
 One final important factor to consider when assessing SLOCs as a motivating factor 
for China’s militarization of the SCS is China’s use of free trade agreements, in particular, 
the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA).379 ACFTA is, by volume, the world’s 
third largest free trade agreement, following the European Union and North American Free 
Trade Areas.380 In 2001, China initiated the agreement to strengthen a sense of regionalism, a 
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stark contrast to China’s prior policies of economic isolation that dominated much of the 20th 
century.381 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)382 is China’s fourth-largest 
trading partner; China is ASEAN’s second-largest trading partner.383 Some of the chief 
threats to ASEAN unity revolve around security concerns, the most significant of which is 
defining a joint response to China’s rise.384 Overlapping maritime claims in the SCS have 
proven the “biggest irritant” among ASEAN’s member states, according to Eleanor Albert of 
the Council on Foreign Relations.385        
 ASEAN has been unable to reach a consensus in its efforts to address China, needing 
to achieve a delicate balance due to collective and individual states’ ties to China. In the 
midst of security concerns, ASEAN states have invested in military modernization; both the 
Philippines and Vietnam have increased their military cooperation with the United States.386 
This has resulted in divided ties between China and the United States, leaving ASEAN 
claimants to SCS maritime space without consensus in the form of an ASEAN-China code of 
conduct for the SCS.387 This is perhaps the most obvious example of ASEAN’s inability to 
achieve consensus on security issues, despite the association’s ability to agree on free trade 
with China and one another.          
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 Open SLOCs in the SCS are critical to ACFTA’s continued economic success. In 
2017, the total import-export volume between ASEAN and China reached a record high of 
nearly $515 billion.388 Chinese researchers Zhang, Chen, and Li studied the geospatial 
associations that exist among urban centers and ports around the SCS to better understand the 
regional, internal development of ACFTA using automatic identification signal (AIS) data 
from commercial vessels to construct marine traffic flows, analyze their spatial hierarchies, 
and assess internal differences in urban agglomeration.389 Through their work, these 
researchers provide a spatial basis for evaluating the development and levels of cooperation 
among cities on the SCS and regional economic interconnectedness, enabling a better 
understanding of the maritime transport that makes ACFTA a successful multi-billion dollar 
undertaking. For example, the most marine traffic-intense route identified was the Hong 
Kong-Singapore route.390         
 Zhang, Chen, and Li identify linkages between geographic communities as 
demonstrating a “clear geographic agglomeration phenomenon;” these communities are 
divided into the Chinese coastal, Taiwan, ASEAN, and Philippine communities.391 Among 
these, Singapore’s strategic geographic location is key to its economic significance; China’s 
SCS port cities have “relatively complete infrastructure” and economic conditions; and 
Philippine cities are clustered due to their similar economic strengths, and mutual influence 
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and promotion.392 Furthermore, the ASEAN community includes 41 cities—or nearly 40 
percent of all coastal cities in the SCS—reflecting ASEAN’s “significant role…in building 
[ACFTA]” and developing regional trade.393 
Conclusion 
ACFTA provides a strong example of the importance of open SLOCs in the SCS; 
however, proponents of the SLOC hypothesis maintain that China may seek to leverage its 
growing military power to inhibit free trade flow. Many scholars counter this argument such 
as Greg Austin, an Asian security scholar, who argues that the “heat being generated outside 
China about its putative threat to commercial shipping…is becoming tiresome…It is not 
clear who invented the ‘China SLOC threat’…but it does not stand close scrutiny.”394 Austin 
writes that the SLOC hypothesis emerged as the PLA Navy paid closer attention to SLOCs 
and discussed risks to shipping more frequently in strategic documents; Austin claims that 
China’s leaders have no expectation that military control of the SCS will enhance military 
power projection capabilities enough to confront the United States and its allies over 
shipping safety.395 Gregory Poling of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 
similarly dismissed the SLOC hypothesis. According to Poling, the hypothesis is misguided 
and rests on inaccurate statistics and irrelevant logic, arguing during a panel on U.S.-China 
geopolitics in the SCS:  
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…it’s [the SLOC hypothesis] irrelevant, as far as I’m concerned with the South 
China Sea. The Chinese are not going to cut off commercial trade through the 
South China Sea. They’re also relying on it…We’re [the United States] not 
[going to] do it. There’s this notion…of the Malacca dilemma. The Chinese 
have been terrified that we or our allies might close the Strait to choke them off 
in some future conflict. But imagine that…we’re willing to cut off 60% of 
Japanese oil and gas shipments to damage the Chinese. We’re already in World 
War III…There is no reasonable level, at which, you can kind of cap that kind 
of escalation.396 
In contrast, Poling argued that fish, oil, and gas resources were more significant 
economic drivers of conflict for claimant states, but that these were not relevant on a 
global level.397 
The hypothetical SLOC threat, nonetheless, creates grounds for concern. As 
discussed, the SCS links the Indian and Pacific Oceans and any diversion would add 
significant global shipping costs to an industry where cost increases can be disastrous. If 
China did militarily control the SCS, it could potentially “capture the increased shipping 
costs through transit taxes,” constricting regional economies including Taiwan, Japan, and 
South Korea.398 When considering China’s overarching international engagement policies in 
recent decades—such as China’s initiation of ACFTA—China’s incentives to initiate conflict 
and disrupt trade and resource flows would be self-defeating.399 This assessment, however, is 
predicated on China’s “continued access to the resources necessary for further development 
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and growth by means of trade or acquisition, which also serves as a linchpin of domestic 
regime stability.”400 With this condition in mind, political scientist David Pak Yue Leon 
deduces that it is too soon to know if tensions in the SCS signify a policy reorientation; 
rather, while China is rising within the current international system successfully, the 
possibility of military escalation or confrontation should not be dismissed.401 Still, from a 
practical standpoint, there is little room for debate over China’s dependence on uninterrupted 
commercial shipping in the SCS; China depends on maritime trade not only for energy, but 
for numerous goods such as agricultural products, of which China is the world’s largest 
importer.402           
 This balance between valid possibilities, practical considerations such as economic 
interdependence and free trade agreements, and widespread uncertainty regarding the 
ultimate direction of China’s SCS policies complicates an understanding of the SLOC 
hypothesis. Accusations that China is undertaking a wholesale effort to undermine the world 
order through potential means, such as disrupting trade, contradict both China’s past actions 
and policies as well as China’s measurable needs. While this analysis appears to indicate that 
the SLOC hypothesis is one of the weaker arguments for China’s militarization of the SCS, 
valid concerns, such as the uncertain nature of economic interdependence, require that this 
hypothesis is not dismissed altogether.  
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China’s island-building and subsequent construction and installation of military 
infrastructure has brought heightened attention to the South China Sea both regionally and 
around the world. At the core, disputes in the SCS are concerned with basic political 
questions of who receives what, when, and how, but occur within the context of overarching 
geopolitical and strategic factors. Three hypotheses for China’s military actions in the SCS—
control of and access to fisheries, hydrocarbons, and sea lines of communication—dominate 
most discussions of the SCS by policy and media sources. While some scholars also argue 
that one or more of these factors are most significant, many take a more nuanced approach, 
pointing to both China’s practical concerns driven largely by economic needs as well as 
broader considerations.      
Fisheries 
 In its second chapter, this thesis discusses the critical role of fisheries for coastal 
states in the Asia-Pacific region. Many developing nations in the region rely heavily on 
fishing and its associated industries for food and economic security. In China, a majority of 
those employed in the fishery sector work in marine capture, although a growing number 
work in aquaculture. Offshore, Chinese fishing vessels serve a dual purpose of both fishing 
and asserting China’s claims to territory beyond the maritime boundaries delimited by the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This has led some scholars and analysts to argue that 
China is operating a maritime militia of fishing vessels outfitted by the Chinese military to 
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assert and defend China’s territorial claims. While evidence on the extent of these activities 
is inconclusive, satellite data reveals that the vast majority of fishing activity is confined to 
near-shore waters within the SCS claimant states’ respective territory. Data on fishing vessel 
types in the SCS corroborates these findings, demonstrating that most vessels are small-scale 
and are not capable of deep-water fishing. China has led efforts to reduce dangerous degrees 
of overfishing in the SCS by announcing annual fishing bans—albeit without the consent of 
its neighbors—both within and beyond its UNCLOS-established territory. China has also 
invested in expanding its distant-water fishing fleet, becoming the world’s largest in terms of 
vessel numbers. This enables China to operate beyond its periphery in waters that do not 
suffer from the same high degrees of fish stock depletions as its near-shore waters. 
Simultaneously, China has increased its aquaculture production to reduce pressure on these 
depleted stocks.          
 While conflicts over fishing in the SCS are unlikely to settle any time soon as 
regional states struggle to manage high demand against dwindling supply, the evidence in 
support of the fisheries hypothesis is mixed. China is working to reduce its own pressure on 
the SCS fisheries through significant structural changes in its fishery sector; however, China 
also maintains contradictory policies such as oil subsidies for fishing vessels, which 
contribute to further depletion. Allegedly, China operates an extensive maritime militia to 
protect its claims in the South China Sea. Furthermore, satellite data and imagery document 
Chinese fishing activity in areas contested by multiple claimants; many vessels observed on 
imagery were not broadcasting identification signals. The complexity of fisheries issues in 
the SCS cannot be fully appreciated in this limited analysis; however, the inclusion of 
geographic considerations offers valuable insight into evidence that both supports and 
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counters the fisheries hypothesis. These contradictions indicate that independently, the 
fisheries hypothesis is not a sufficient justification for China’s militarization of the SCS. 
Hydrocarbons 
 The role of oil and gas in prompting conflict is well-documented. It is unsurprising 
that this factor is brought up regularly in writings on the SCS. Despite its frequent 
appearance, particularly in media sources, the hydrocarbons hypothesis—like the fisheries 
hypothesis—is characterized by mixed supporting evidence. China demonstrably depends 
heavily on oil. While natural gas is a substantially smaller component of China’s energy mix 
than oil, its importance is increasing as Beijing works to develop cleaner sources of energy to 
combat pollution and climate change due to high CO2 emissions. China’s need for 
hydrocarbons—in the face of rising demand and plateauing production levels—is evident. 
What is less clear is the ability of hydrocarbons in the SCS, if successfully accessed and 
extracted, to accommodate China’s needs.       
 Based upon the geology of the SCS, it is unlikely that the most contested areas of the 
SCS—including the Spratly and Paracel island groups—feature significant amounts of 
hydrocarbons. Satellite data indicates that offshore drilling in contested areas of the SCS by 
any claimant state is limited. The most infamous incident of such activity—China’s 
deployment of a drilling rig in waters also claimed by Vietnam—ended with China retreating 
from its efforts ahead of schedule. This deployment, as stated by Chinese officials, served 
both to expand offshore exploration and to assert China’s maritime claims. While offshore 
platforms in contested space serve strategic purposes, they also expand states’ understanding 
of resource potential as they seek to improve their energy security. Nonetheless, a 
comprehensive understanding of the SCS’s energy production potential is limited by wide-
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ranging estimates and limited cooperation between regional states to explore this potential. 
Despite acknowledged limitations, there is compelling evidence that the most contested areas 
of the SCS, including China’s militarized features, likely have little potential to produce 
hydrocarbons if China or another claimant attempt to explore these areas. This assessment 
was consistent in both Western and Chinese literature and resource and reserve estimates, 
although overall estimates of SCS hydrocarbon potential varied significantly. Analyzing the 
SCS hydrocarbons geographically—rather than in terms of overall resource or reserve 
estimated capacities and values—improves understanding of hydrocarbons’ geopolitical 
dimensions in the SCS, and also prompts consideration of other possible explanations for 
China’s militarization of the SCS due to the limited ability of hydrocarbons to account for 
China’s actions. 
Sea Lines of Communication 
 Every year, trillions of dollars in trade pass through the SCS along sea lines of 
communication. Although previous estimates are demonstrably inflated, the significance of 
the SCS to regional and global trade is well-established and understood more clearly through 
analysis of geospatial data. While the United States has played a dominant role in the region 
through a powerful naval presence, China’s naval investment—likely intended to counter 
both U.S. hegemony and ability to control strategic chokepoints—has sparked concerns that 
China may soon be able to inhibit shipping through the Sea in the event of conflict.  
 While China’s naval power is growing, it is unclear how China would benefit from 
restricting commercial shipping traffic. China’s economic power depends heavily on 
commercial shipping both to import foreign goods and to export its products to foreign 
markets. China has over a dozen free trade agreements in effect and others currently under 
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negotiation. These are primarily bilateral agreements; however, in the early 2000s, China 
initiated the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement and ASEAN is China’s fourth-largest 
trading partner. These examples of economic interdependence may serve to reduce the risks 
of militarized conflict. Furthermore, the SCS is a key route for global oil and liquefied 
natural gas shipments. Countries from which China receives the bulk of its oil and gas 
shipments not only rely on the Chinese market but also depend on the SCS for a fast shipping 
route to other markets in and beyond East Asia. China depends on open trade routes that 
maximize efficiency and minimize transportation costs for energy security, as does the rest of 
the world. In addition, rather than seeking solely to compete with U.S. military strength, 
China is investing in pipelines to enhance its energy security. Impeding shipping in the SCS 
would not only damage the economies of other claimants and the many states around the 
world that rely on the SCS shipping routes but would also cause immense harm to China’s 
own economy. While the possibility of China cutting off commercial trade in the SCS 
appears minimal from a practical standpoint, the risks to commercial trade in the event of 
escalating territorial disputes or conflict with the United States could have grave regional and 
global economic consequences. Conflating SLOCs with Chinese militarization of the SCS 
obscures broader economic realities. 
Why China is Militarizing the South China Sea 
 This thesis examines three hypotheses for China’s militarization of the SCS. These 
actions specifically refer to China’s decisions to place military infrastructure and tools of 
power projection on maritime features within contested territory, as well as China’s 
expansion of military capabilities to more effectively control its periphery. While China 
emphasizes that its actions occur within sovereign territory, citing historic claims, these 
claims developed primarily in the 20th century and are not clearly defined geographically. 
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Furthermore, the analysis presented in the three central chapters of this thesis calls into 
question the actual strategic importance of China’s island claims and militarization. This 
does not account for the significance of China’s bases in the SCS to China’s status as a rising 
power that will soon be capable of contesting the United States’ hegemony in the region. 
Southeast Asia historian Alfred McCoy claims that military bases are “iconic markers for 
both geopolitical dominion and imperial transition.”403 McCoy explicates that rapid 
technological change has made the persistent importance of military bases perplexing, 
writing that bases are vulnerable in times of conflict but are also vital to the “aspirations of 
any hegemonic power.”404 Despite their vulnerability, McCoy assesses that China’s bases 
transform the SCS into “de facto territorial waters” enabling both access to and effective 
control over fisheries, hydrocarbons, and SLOCs while extending China’s “penumbra of 
hegemony.” This emphasis connects with the claims presented in this thesis that East Asia is 
undergoing a regional power transition driven by China after decades of U.S. hegemony. In 
contrast, tensions and conflicts between China and other claimant states are driven by 
territorial nationalism, connected by resource nationalism and historical animosities;405 
however, these factors are not the focus of this discussion.     
 Based on the consistently mixed evidence for each hypothesis studied in this thesis, 
there is no clear consensus that fisheries, hydrocarbons, or sea lines of communication are 
individually responsible for motivating China’s militarization of the SCS. Analysis of 
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geospatial data and incorporation of geographic considerations makes the nuances of each 
possible motivator more apparent. Furthermore, power transition and hegemonic power 
projection as well as territorial nationalism are likely overarching factors that influence, 
prolong, and exacerbate tensions. Across the Pacific, China’s actions have gained increasing 
attention in recent years fueling significant alarm. Political scientist Graham Allison’s 
question of whether China and the United States are on a path to conflict has brought 
heightened attention to the SCS. Allison posits in Destined for War: Can America and China 
Escape Thucidides’s Trap? that China and the United States are on a collision course—
desired by neither country—due to a pattern of structural stressors that develop as rising 
powers challenge dominant hegemons.406 Allison does not argue that this war is inevitable 
but points to historic evidence that demonstrates the propensity for war under conditions such 
as those the United States and China face today.      
 If major conflict were to occur between China and the United States, or between 
China and another claimant that would involve the United States, the effects would be 
disastrous. Speculations to these points often neglect China’s incentives to avoid conflict, 
including those discussed in the previous chapter on SLOCs. Claims that war in the SCS is 
brewing or that China is working to undermine or overthrow the international liberal order 
often cite China’s militarization in the SCS as evidence. An examination of the fisheries, 
hydrocarbons, and sea lines of communication hypotheses finds no substantial evidence that 
any of these adequately explain China’s actions. In and of themselves, each explanation for 
China’s militarization of the SCS is incomplete. China’s overarching considerations of 
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asserting its role as a growing regional power in the face of a significant U.S. military 
presence, as well as defending territory viewed as sovereign, are additional considerations 
that likely factor into China’s actions. This thesis has used geographic tools and information 
that, to date, have remained largely neglected in geopolitical studies of the SCS disputes. 
This addition informs each hypothesis, finding evidence that both supports and undermines 
each common claim. While neither the fisheries, nor hydrocarbons, nor SLOCs hypotheses 
stand close scrutiny independently, their significance becomes clear when these factors are 
combined. Future studies would do well to avoid oversimplifying the complexities of the 
situation in the SCS, many of which are beyond the scope of this analysis. However, the 
findings presented herein offer value to future studies as the SCS disputes continue to 
develop, demonstrating the criticality of recognizing both China’s immediate and practical 
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